This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-11-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It is further established that when doubt exists as to the true nature of the parties' transaction, courts must construe such transaction purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, as the latter involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests over the property in controversy.[34] Thus, in several cases, the Court has not hesitated to declare a purported contract of sale to be an equitable mortgage based solely on one of the enumerated circumstances under Article 1602. So it should be in the present case. | |||||
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2006-08-10 |
CORONA, J. |
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| In determining whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage, the court is not limited to the written memorials of the transaction. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between them leading to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding.[16] (emphasis and underscoring ours) | |||||
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2005-09-20 |
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| For the presumption in Article 1602 of the New Civil Code to arise, two requirements must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and (b) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. The existence of any of the circumstances defined in Article 1602 of the New Civil Code, not the concurrence nor an overwhelming number of such circumstances is sufficient for a contract of sale to be presumed an equitable mortgage.[44] | |||||
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2005-09-20 |
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| There is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage. The decisive factor in evaluating such deed is the intention of the parties as shown by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, and declarations of the parties before, during and after the execution of said deed, and generally all pertinent facts having a tendency to determine the real nature of their design and understanding.[48] As such, documentary and parol evidence may be adduced by the parties. When in doubt, courts are generally inclined to construe a transaction purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, which involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests over the property in controversy.[49] | |||||
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2005-04-26 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| It is settled that the clarity of contract terms and the name given to it do not bar the Court from ascertaining the true interest of the parties. In Aguirre v. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court declared: In determining the nature of a contract, courts are not bound by the title or name given by the parties. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement. As such, therefore, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove such intention.[30] In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court emphasized that: In determining whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage, the court is not limited to the writing memorials of the transaction. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between them leading to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties. | |||||
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2004-05-28 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| It is well-settled that the presence of even one of the foregoing circumstances is sufficient to declare a contract as an equitable mortgage,[65] in consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of property rights.[66] For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602, two requisites must concur: (1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale; and (2) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage.[67] | |||||
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2004-01-21 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Decisive for the proper determination of the true nature of the transaction between the parties is the intent of the parties. There is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage.[16] To determine whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage in reality, the court is not limited to the written memorials of the transaction. This is so because the decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situations of the parties at that time; the attitudes, acts, conduct, and declarations of the parties; the negotiations between them leading to the deed; and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties.[17] | |||||