This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2012-02-06 |
BRION, J. |
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| However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process.[20] The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence.[21] It does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence.[22] A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct.[23] In other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.[24] | |||||
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2012-02-01 |
SERENO, J. |
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| This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court's acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80] | |||||
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2011-12-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case,[19] nor can it be modified except to eliminate something which is civil or administrative in nature.20 One exception to the rule is when the prosecution is denied due process of law.[21] Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused's demurrer to evidence.[22] If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting Goodland's prayer is not tantamount to putting Co and Chan in double jeopardy. | |||||
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2006-07-11 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| As early as US v. Valencia,[8] this Court, through Justice Charles A. Willard, ruled that once an Information has been filed in court, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the case; and, accordingly, it is the court, not the fiscal, which has control over it. In US v. Barredo,[9] this Court explained that fiscals are not clothed with the power to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions once these have been instituted, for the power to dismiss is solely vested in the court. The Barredo doctrine has continuously been applied through the years.[10] In other words, once a court acquires jurisdiction, the same continues until the termination of the case.[11] The rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether it be dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.[12] The only qualification to this exercise of the judicial prerogative is that the substantial rights of the accused must not be impaired[13] nor the People be deprived of the right to due process.[14] | |||||
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2004-02-24 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Noteworthy is the case of People v. Velasco[16] where the Court likewise dismissed a similar petition not only on the ground that the acquittal of the defendant by the lower court was not reviewable via the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the grant of said petition would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. In Velasco, we clarified that in the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e. the criminal trial was a sham, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[17] a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or at the Court of Appeals.[18] | |||||
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2001-08-20 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature,[8] to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion,[9] or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial.[10] A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.[11] | |||||
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2000-09-13 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.[87] Condemning the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court minced no words in declaring that "[i]t is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process x x x x [T]he sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial, and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused x x x x Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian president to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal, such as that in the case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is 'a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw.' It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. 'To paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law; he invites every man to become a law unto himself; he invites anarchy.' The contention of respondent-accused that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ended the case and could not be appealed or reopened without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals:[88] | |||||