This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-12-07 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| More importantly, in Montierro v. Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc.[46] and Eyana v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.,[47] the Court applied the ruling in Kestrel, that if the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to October 6, 2008, the rule on the 120-day period, during which the disability assessment should have been made in accordance with Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,[48] that is, the doctrine then prevailing before the promulgation of Vergara on October 6, 2008, stands; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule applies. | |||||
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2015-10-21 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Accordingly, permanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness but the inability to do substantially all material acts necessary to the prosecution of a gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life. In disability compensation, it is not the injury per se which is compensated but the incapacity to work.[14] | |||||
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2015-09-23 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| It is undisputed that respondent was declared fit to work by Dr. Alegre only on 9 June 2003,[46] or 148 days after the former's repatriation on 12 January 2003.[47] Pursuant to the ruling in Crystal Shipping, the fact that the assessment was made beyond the 120-day period prescribed in the Labor Code is sufficient basis to declare that respondent suffered permanent total disability.[48] This condition entitles him to the maximum disability benefit of USD 60,000 under the POEA-SEC.[49] | |||||