This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2013-01-30 |
REYES, J. |
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| PALI moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in an Order[15] dated March 30, 2004. The RTC declared the subject mortgage as voidable since there is nothing in Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 suggesting that the failure to secure the approval of the HLURB relative to the execution of the said mortgage would render the same as void. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that while the subject mortgage is voidable, PALI is estopped from questioning its validity. The RTC explained that: The point of contention is Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 which provides in part, to wit: "No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the authority (now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board or HLURB)." Certainly, the prohibition is mandatory since it commands and leaves no discretion in the matter. It is true that as provided by Article 5, Civil Code, "Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity." But the word "void" refers to both acts which are ipso facto void and to acts which are merely voidable (Municipality of Camiling vs. Lopez, 99 Phil. 187, cited in Aquino and Griño-Aquino, The Civil Code of the Philippines and Family Code, 1990 ed., p. 12). In the cited case, it was held that the lease of fishponds executed by a municipality, without the consent of the provincial governor as required by law, was merely voidable and not void ab initio. The instant controversy is akin to the Municipality of Camiling case in that a prior approval or consent by a specific authority is a pre-requisite to the validity of a given transaction. Yet, the absence of such previous consent merely makes the transaction voidable, or valid unless and until made void. Consequently, the real estate mortgage between the parties without the antecedent HLURB written approval is only voidable, and remains valid until set aside. | |||||
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2011-09-07 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate jurisdiction over ejectment cases decided by the MeTC, MTC or MCTC. We note that petitioners' attack on the validity of the RTC decision pertains to a relief erroneously granted on appeal, and beyond the scope of judgment provided in Section 6 (now Section 17) of Rule 70.[18] While the court in an ejectment case may delve on the issue of ownership or possession de jure solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession de facto, it has no jurisdiction to settle with finality the issue of ownership[19] and any pronouncement made by it on the question of ownership is provisional in nature.[20] A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.[21] We have held that although it was proper for the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate with semblance of finality the ownership of the property to either party by ordering the cancellation of the TCT.[22] | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| If allowed to be carried out, the act against which the injunction is directed, the implementation of the writ of execution, would violate petitioners' rights as the registered owners and actual possessors of the property in dispute. The registered owner has the right to possess and enjoy his property, without any limitations other than those imposed by law.[42] The implementation of the writ of execution would unduly deprive petitioners, as the registered owners, of their right to possess the subject property, which is one of the attributes of ownership.[43] | |||||
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2005-04-29 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| On the other hand, certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[9] Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure,[10] which was then applicable, expressly provided, in part, that "the decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice hereof." In relation to this provision, Section 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657 prescribes that any party who does not agree with the decision (in the summary administrative proceedings) may bring the matter to the court for final determination of just compensation. | |||||