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ROMEO R. ARAULLO v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

This case has been cited 1 times or more.

2014-07-30
REYES, J.
Given this provision, the quashal of the writ was then only necessary to rectify LA Anni's prior issuance of a writ of execution notwithstanding a pending motion for re-computation that was filed by Club Filipino. Araullo failed to establish that the labor officials were impelled by any motive other than the correction of this error. At any rate, this issue on the propriety of the quashal of the writ had been resolved by the Court in an earlier review. In Romeo R. Araullo v. Office of the Ombudsman,[26] which was an appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman's dismissal of Araullo's administrative complaint for grave misconduct against the same labor officials herein charged and also on the same basis of the quashal of LA Anni's writ of execution, the Court declared: There is no doubt that [LA] Anni's July 29, 2008 Writ of Execution was procedurally irregular, as it pre-empted the NLRC Rules which require that where further computation of the award in the decision is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no Writ of Execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the [LA] in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the matter. When the writ was issued, there was as yet no order approving the computation made by the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there was a pending and unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A cursory examination of the motion reveals that it raised valid issues that required determination in order to arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the parties would be unjustly enriched. For example, it appears that petitioner owed Club Filipino a substantial amount of money which the latter sought to deduct from the judgment award by way of compensation; if this is true, then the necessary adjustment in the award may be made to allow Club Filipino to recover what petitioner owes it, to the extent allowable by law.