This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The 2000 POEA SEC recognizes that the list of illnesses under Section 32 is not exhaustive. In Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. Salazar,[48] this court explained that: [u]nlike Section 20(A), Section 32-A of the POEA Contract considers the possibility of compensation for the death of the seafarer occurring after the termination of the employment contract on account of a work-related illness. But, for death under this provision to be compensable, the claimant must fulfill the following: | |||||
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2014-08-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| It is an oft-repeated rule that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by no less than substantial evidence.[26] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It must reach the level of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.[27] The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely apparent.[28] As such, the burden to prove entitlement to death benefits lies on the petitioner.[29] | |||||
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2014-07-28 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| On that note, we emphasize that making factual findings based only on presumptions[23] and absent the quantum of evidence required in labor cases[24] is an erroneous application of the law on compensation proceedings. This Court has ruled in Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.,[25] citing Government Service Insurance System v. Cuntapay,[26] that claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.[27] | |||||