This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2015-09-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In Maersk Filipinos Crewing, Inc./Maersk Services Ltd. v. Mesina,[31] this Court held that there is a reasonable connection between the nature of one's work and his contracting psoriasis when, in the performance of his duties, strong detergents, fabric conditioners, special soaps, and other chemicals are used. The Court therein declared that — | |||||
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2015-07-15 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In this case, despite the finding of fitness to work by the company-designated physicians, the CA declared respondent entitled to permanent total disability benefits for failure of the former to declare the latter fit to work within the 120-day period provided under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, citing the ruling in the cases of Valenzona v. Fair Shipping Corporation[32] (Valenzona) and Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Mesina[33] (Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc.) that declared a seafarer permanently disabled if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days. Both Valenzona and Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. stemmed from the ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad[34] that characterized permanent disability as the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. | |||||
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2015-06-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| More importantly, the 2000 POEA-SEC has created a presumption of compensability for those illnesses which are not listed as an occupational disease. Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) states that “those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.” Concomitant with this presumption is the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish compensability of illnesses not included in the list of occupational diseases.[40] As discussed above, a causal link was established between Gazzingan’s employment and his ailment. In view thereof, the presumption now operates in favor of respondents and the burden is shifted to the petitioners to overcome the statutory presumption. However, in the case at bench, petitioners failed to discharge such burden as will be discussed below. | |||||
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2015-02-11 |
REYES, J. |
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| The CA cited Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc./Maersk Services Ltd. v. Mesina[14] on what constitutes permanent as well as total disability, thus: Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. A total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.[15] (Italics ours) | |||||
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2015-01-28 |
REYES, J. |
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| The Court also notes that nowhere is it shown in the records that the petitioner was re-employed as a utility cleaner by PTCI or by any other manning agency from the time of his repatriation on August 17, 2006 until the filing of the instant petition in 2009. This, to the Court, is an eloquent proof of his permanent disability.[49] | |||||
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2015-01-14 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| First, Montierro insists that the 120-day rule laid down in the 2005 case Crystal Shipping, and not the 240-day rule introduced by the 2008 case Vergara, applies to this case. Montierro cites the more recent cases Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., v. Tanawan,[25] Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Mesina,[26] and Valenzona v. Fair Shipping Corp.,[27] all of which applied the Crystal Shipping doctrine despite the fact that they were promulgated after Vergara. | |||||
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2014-06-25 |
REYES, J. |
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| The Court has held, however, that the enumeration in Section 32-A does not preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties.[43] This is in view of Section 20(B)(4)[44] of the POEA-SEC which states that "(t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related." Concomitant with such presumption is the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his working conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.[45] "[I]t is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted."[46] | |||||
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2014-03-03 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Regarding the issue of compensability, it has been the Court's consistent ruling that in disability compensation, "it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity."[30] Moreover, "the list of illnesses/diseases in Section 32-A[31] does not preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties."[32] | |||||
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2014-01-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| 240[45]-day treatment period, while the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period, and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee's fitness or disability. This is true "regardless of whether the employee loses the use of any part of his body."[46] Respondent was repatriated on October 12, 2004 and underwent treatment by the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, until October 14, 2005, or for a continuous period of over one year or for more than the statutory 120-day[47] or even | |||||