This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2015-06-15 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| We are convinced that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. We note that he admitted to having killed the victim albeit in self-defense. The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admit that they are the authors of the death of the victim, and their defense is anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon them to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.[19] | |||||
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2014-11-26 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In any case, eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant to be present at the scene of the crime. "Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable."[18] | |||||
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2014-10-22 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing as there is nothing to repel. The unlawful aggression of the victim must put the life and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual peril. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression.[37] | |||||
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2014-10-13 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[58] Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. In fact, Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong, admitted that they were near the school before the incident and at the school minutes after the killing took place. Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the school, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be, unnoticed. | |||||
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2014-07-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[59] Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. As held by the Court of Appeals, "[j]udicial notice was taken of the fact that Barangay Bitan-o in Sorsogon City where the accused claimed they were at the time of the shooting and the area of the sea adjacent to the municipality of Castilla where the incident took place are neighboring sites that can be negotiated with the use of a banca in one hour or less."[60] Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the fishpen, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be, unnoticed. | |||||
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2014-06-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| That accused-appellant presented his mother to corroborate his alibi that he was at the farm on the date of the first charge of rape; and interposed a vehement denial for the second one, are of no significance. Such prevarication was devoid of any persuasion due to it being easily and conveniently resorted to, and due to denial being generally weaker than and not prevailing over the positive assertions of an eyewitness. It has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[41] Here, accused-appellant utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. From his own testimony, he impressed upon the Court that the distance between the farm and AAA's house is merely 50 meters. Certainly, 50 meters is not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellant at the house of AAA, and/or for him to slip away from his mother unnoticed. But that he presented his mother to attest to his presence at the farm during the times that the two counts of rape were said to have been committed, did not help him one bit. If truth be told, his testimony and that of his mother contradicted each other on material points; hence more deleterious to his defense. | |||||
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2014-04-02 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Joramel and Cherme positively and categorically identified appellant as the one who shot and killed Imelda. Their testimonies corroborated each other on material details. Moreover, there is no showing that Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill motive to testify against appellant. It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the part of the witnesses, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[37] On the other hand, appellant only offered his bare denial of the offense. However, "[t]he Court had consistently stressed that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses."[38] The Court, therefore, finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. "It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect since trial courts have first-hand account on the witnesses' manner of testifying and demeanor during trial. The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue of credibility."[39] Furthermore, "in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion on the court a quo, and especially when the findings of the judge have been adopted and affirmed by the CA, the factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed."[40] | |||||
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2014-02-12 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Moreover, such prevarication was devoid of any persuasion due to its being easily and conveniently resorted to, and due to denial being generally weaker than and not prevailing over the positive assertions of an eyewitness. It has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[56] | |||||
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2014-01-22 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, appellants put forward the defense of alibi which necessarily fails in the face of positive identification. It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable.[14] Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.[15] An examination of the record would indicate that Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were unable to present a corroborating witness to support their alibi that they were working at a farm owned by a certain Boyle on the date and time of Pionio Yacapin's murder. While the witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the respective alibis of Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who are hardly the disinterested witnesses that is required by jurisprudence. | |||||
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2014-01-15 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Nevertheless, it is jurisprudentially settled that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable.[19] It is likewise settled that where there is nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[20] In the case at bar, no allegation was made nor proven to show that Jefferson had any ill motive to falsely testify against appellant. | |||||