This case has been cited 18 times or more.
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized.[199] (Citations omitted) | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.[228] Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales: A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.[229] (Citations omitted) | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the three requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech.[249] "When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity,"[250] and it is subject only to the intermediate approach.[251] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.[253] | |||||
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2014-09-02 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The authority of the COMELEC to impose airtime limits directly flows from the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006 [2001])[32] one hundred (120) minutes of television advertisement and one-hundred eighty (180) minutes for radio advertisement. For the 2004 elections, the respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 6520[33] implementing the airtime limits by applying said limitation on a per station basis.[34] Such manner of determining airtime limits was likewise adopted for the 2007 elections, through Resolution No. 7767.[35] In the 2010 elections, under Resolution No. 8758,[36] the same was again adopted. But for the 2013 elections, the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, chose to aggregate the total broadcast time among the different broadcast media, thus: Section 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda through Mass Media. All parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space for their election propaganda during the campaign period subject to the following requirements and/or limitations: | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule.[101] Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above. | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.[91] In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.[92] | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or informative. Specifically, in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans, this Court stated that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of expression. (Citations omitted) [148] | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case. For there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms are never set in stone. Issues revolving on their construct must be decided on a case to case basis, always based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of each case. But in cases where the challenged acts are patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking them down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.[157] | |||||
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2011-03-08 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The newspaper's[16] [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here: http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/ | |||||
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2010-04-07 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,[18] Tatad v. Executive Secretary,[19] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority[20] and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[21] just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,[22] this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.[23] | |||||
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2010-03-15 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In this case, the subject speech by petitioner was broadcast starting 10:00 p.m. onwards, clearly within the safe harbor period as established in Action for Children's Television. Correctly applying Pacifica's context-based ruling, petitioner's speech, if indeed indecent, enjoys constitutional protection and may not be sanctioned. The rule on this matter, as laid down by Pacifica in relation to Action for Children's Television, is crystal-clear. But should the majority still have any doubt in their minds, such doubt should be resolved in favor of free speech and against any interference by government. The suspension of "Ang Dating Daan" by the MTRCB was a content-based, not a content-neutral regulation. Thus, the suspension should have been subjected to strict scrutiny following the rule in Chavez v. Gonzales.[23] The test should be strict because the regulation went into the very heart of the rationale for the right to free speech - that speech may not be prohibited just because government officials disapprove of the speaker's views.[24] | |||||
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2009-07-15 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition against respondent.[4] | |||||
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2009-04-29 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. But while a jurisprudential pattern involving certain offensive utterances conveyed in different mediums has emerged, this case is veritably one of first impression, it being the first time that indecent speech communicated via television and the applicable norm for its regulation are, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation,[37] a 1978 American landmark case cited in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr.[38] and Chavez v. Gonzales,[39] is a rich source of persuasive lessons. Foremost of these relates to indecent speech without prurient appeal component coming under the category of protected speech depending on the context within which it was made, irresistibly suggesting that, within a particular context, such indecent speech may validly be categorized as unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction. | |||||
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2009-04-02 |
TINGA, J. |
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| At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between acontent-neutralregulation,i.e.,merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, orone that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards;and acontent-basedrestraint or censorship,i.e.,the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.[43] Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression.[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.[45] | |||||
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2008-12-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo[23] articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."[24] The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales[25] even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them."[26] | |||||