Lawyerly

GR No. 212878

2016-02-01

MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS. v. WILFREDO L. CABATAY

BRION, J.

As intimated earlier, the POEA-SEC and the TCC-FA govern Cabatay's employment with the petitioners. These two instruments are the law between the parties as the Court emphasized in Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc., v. Eulogio Dumadag.[20]

GR No. 212049

2015-07-15

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. ROMEO V. PANOGALINOG

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Note that while respondent has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors under Section 20 (B) of the POEA-SEC and the CBA, it bears stressing that the employer is liable for a seafarer's disability, arising from a work-related injury or illness, only after the degree of disability has been established by the company-designated physician and, if the seafarer consulted with a physician of his choice whose assessment disagrees with that of the company designated physician, the disagreement must be referred to a third doctor for a final assessment.[43] No such mandated third doctor was, however, consulted to settle the conflicting findings of the company-designated physicians (Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan) and the respondent's own doctor (Dr. Jacinto). To this, Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[44] holds:The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. The two instruments are the law between them. They are bound by their terms and conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. x x x Durnadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the company-designated physician, issued her fit-to-work certification for him. There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem arose only when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions, without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.

GR No. 191899

2015-06-22

JULIUS R. TAGALOG v. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES INC.

PEREZ, J.

We had in several cases upheld the findings of the company-designated physician due to the non-referral by the seafarer to a third doctor. In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency v. Dumadag,[17] we considered the filing of the complaint by the seafarer as a breach of his contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. The case of Formerly INC Shipmanagement v. Rosales[18] was categorical in stating that non-referral to a third physician, whose decision shall be considered as final and binding, constitutes a breach of the POEA-SEC.

GR No. 203804

2015-04-15

DARIO A. CARCEDO v. MAINE MARINE PHILIPPINES

CARPIO, J.

In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency v. Dumadag,[51] the Court lamented: The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties' level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court.[52]

GR No. 206285

2015-02-04

VERITAS MARITIME CORPORATION v. RAMON A. GEPANAGA

MENDOZA, J.

Interpreting an almost identical provision of the CBA, the Court ruled, in the recent case of Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[22] (Dumadag), that a seafarer's non-compliance with the mandated procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA militates against his claims. In Dumadag, the Court explained: The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. The two instruments are the law between them. They are bound by their terms and conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. In Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, the Court said: "The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them." Dumadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the company-designated physician, issued the fit-to-work certification for him. There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem only arose when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physician's opinions, without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.

GR No. 211211

2015-01-14

ROMMEL B. DARAUG v. KGJS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA

MENDOZA, J.

Interpreting an almost identical provision of the CBA, the Court ruled, in the recent case of Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[32] (Dumagdag), that a seafarer's non-compliance with the mandated procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA militates against his claims. In Dumagdag, the Court explained: The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. The two instruments are the law between them. They are bound by their terms and conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. In Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, the Court said: "The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them." Dumadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the company-designated physician, issued his fit-to-work certification for him. There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem only arose when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions, without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.

GR No. 204699

2014-11-12

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES v. JOEL P. HIPE

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Second, Hipe failed to comply with the procedure laid down under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarer's personal doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician's fit-to-work assessment. In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[73] (Philippine Hammonia), the Court held that the seafarer's non-compliance with the said conflict-resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician, viz.:[74]

GR No. 195832

2014-10-01

FORMERLY INC SHIPMANAGEMENT v. BENJAMIN I. ROSALES

BRION, J.

In the settlement of this conflict, we need not provide a lengthy discussion as we have resolved this matter in Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,[20] citing Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC: If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the [e]mployer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. (Emphasis ours)

GR No. 198367

2014-08-06

OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA v. JOSELITO B. PELLAZAR

BRION, J.

The Court was faced with the same question in Philippine Hammonia v. Dumadag.[24] Applying the similar provisions in the POEA-SEC and in the parties' CBA, the Court observed that the parties are bound by the terms and conditions contained in these instruments, particularly the above quoted provision on the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. Since the seafarer pursued his claim before the labor tribunals without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination, the seafarer actually breached his contractual obligation. In reversing the labor tribunals' rulings (and the CA which affirmed it), the Court said: We find the rulings of the labor authorities seriously flawed as they were rendered in total disregard of the law between the parties the POEA-SEC and the CBA on the prescribed procedure for the determination of disability compensation claims, particularly with respect to the resolution of conflicting disability assessments of the company-designated physician and Dumadag's physicians, without saying why it was disregarded or ignored; it was as if the POEA-SEC and the CBA did not exist. This is grave abuse of discretion, considering that, as labor dispute adjudicators, the LA and the NLRC are expected to uphold the law.

GR No. 203472

2014-07-09

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. HENRY M. SIMBAJON

BRION, J.

In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,[61] we have ruled that the POEA-SEC is the law between the parties and as such, its provisions bind both of them. Under the POEA-SEC, the applicable provision to resolve the issue of conflicting medical findings is Section 20-B (3), which states: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

GR No. 180343

2014-07-09

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES v. CRISANTE C. CONSTANTINO

BRION, J.

First. The employment relationship between Constantino and the petitioners is governed by the POEA-SEC, otherwise known as the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels.[23] Thus, when the seafarer enters into an individual contract with the employer, as Constantino did in February 2002,[24] the terms and conditions of the contract must be in accordance with the POEA-SEC and shall be strictly and faithfully observed.[25] It is customary therefore that the individual contract between the seafarer and the employer (such as the contract between Constantino and the petitioners) is verified and approved by the POEA. As had been declared by the Court in an earlier ruling, the POEA-SEC is the law between the parties, together with their CBA, if there any.[26]

GR No. 203161

2014-02-26

MARTIN K. AYUNGO v. BEAMKO SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer," and that "[t]he third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties." In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[50] (Philippine Hammonia), the Court held that the seafarer's non-compliance with the said conflict-resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician, viz.: The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of Dumadag's contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. x x x Thus, the complaint should have been dismissed, for without a binding

	GR No. 212878 2016-02-01	MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS. v. WILFREDO L. CABATAY BRION, J.
As intimated earlier, the POEA-SEC and the TCC-FA govern Cabatay's employment with the petitioners. These two instruments are the law between the parties as the Court emphasized in Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc., v. Eulogio Dumadag.[20]
	GR No. 212049 2015-07-15	MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. ROMEO V. PANOGALINOG PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Note that while respondent has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors under Section 20 (B) of the POEA-SEC and the CBA, it bears stressing that the employer is liable for a seafarer's disability, arising from a work-related injury or illness, only after the degree of disability has been established by the company-designated physician and, if the seafarer consulted with a physician of his choice whose assessment disagrees with that of the company designated physician, the disagreement must be referred to a third doctor for a final assessment.[43] No such mandated third doctor was, however, consulted to settle the conflicting findings of the company-designated physicians (Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan) and the respondent's own doctor (Dr. Jacinto). To this, Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[44] holds:The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. The two instruments are the law between them. They are bound by their terms and conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. x x x Durnadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the company-designated physician, issued her fit-to-work certification for him. There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem arose only when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions, without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.
	GR No. 191899 2015-06-22	JULIUS R. TAGALOG v. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES INC. PEREZ, J.
We had in several cases upheld the findings of the company-designated physician due to the non-referral by the seafarer to a third doctor. In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency v. Dumadag,[17] we considered the filing of the complaint by the seafarer as a breach of his contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. The case of Formerly INC Shipmanagement v. Rosales[18] was categorical in stating that non-referral to a third physician, whose decision shall be considered as final and binding, constitutes a breach of the POEA-SEC.
	GR No. 203804 2015-04-15	DARIO A. CARCEDO v. MAINE MARINE PHILIPPINES CARPIO, J.
In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency v. Dumadag,[51] the Court lamented: The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties' level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court.[52]
	GR No. 206285 2015-02-04	VERITAS MARITIME CORPORATION v. RAMON A. GEPANAGA MENDOZA, J.
Interpreting an almost identical provision of the CBA, the Court ruled, in the recent case of Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[22] (Dumadag), that a seafarer's non-compliance with the mandated procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA militates against his claims. In Dumadag, the Court explained: The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. The two instruments are the law between them. They are bound by their terms and conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. In Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, the Court said: "The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them." Dumadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the company-designated physician, issued the fit-to-work certification for him. There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem only arose when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physician's opinions, without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.
	GR No. 211211 2015-01-14	ROMMEL B. DARAUG v. KGJS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA MENDOZA, J.
Interpreting an almost identical provision of the CBA, the Court ruled, in the recent case of Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[32] (Dumagdag), that a seafarer's non-compliance with the mandated procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA militates against his claims. In Dumagdag, the Court explained: The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. The two instruments are the law between them. They are bound by their terms and conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. In Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, the Court said: "The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them." Dumadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the company-designated physician, issued his fit-to-work certification for him. There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem only arose when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions, without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.
	GR No. 204699 2014-11-12	BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES v. JOEL P. HIPE PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Second, Hipe failed to comply with the procedure laid down under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarer's personal doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician's fit-to-work assessment. In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[73] (Philippine Hammonia), the Court held that the seafarer's non-compliance with the said conflict-resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician, viz.:[74]
	GR No. 195832 2014-10-01	FORMERLY INC SHIPMANAGEMENT v. BENJAMIN I. ROSALES BRION, J.
In the settlement of this conflict, we need not provide a lengthy discussion as we have resolved this matter in Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,[20] citing Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC: If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the [e]mployer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. (Emphasis ours)
	GR No. 198367 2014-08-06	OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA v. JOSELITO B. PELLAZAR BRION, J.
The Court was faced with the same question in Philippine Hammonia v. Dumadag.[24] Applying the similar provisions in the POEA-SEC and in the parties' CBA, the Court observed that the parties are bound by the terms and conditions contained in these instruments, particularly the above quoted provision on the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. Since the seafarer pursued his claim before the labor tribunals without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination, the seafarer actually breached his contractual obligation. In reversing the labor tribunals' rulings (and the CA which affirmed it), the Court said: We find the rulings of the labor authorities seriously flawed as they were rendered in total disregard of the law between the parties the POEA-SEC and the CBA on the prescribed procedure for the determination of disability compensation claims, particularly with respect to the resolution of conflicting disability assessments of the company-designated physician and Dumadag's physicians, without saying why it was disregarded or ignored; it was as if the POEA-SEC and the CBA did not exist. This is grave abuse of discretion, considering that, as labor dispute adjudicators, the LA and the NLRC are expected to uphold the law.
	GR No. 203472 2014-07-09	MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. HENRY M. SIMBAJON BRION, J.
In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,[61] we have ruled that the POEA-SEC is the law between the parties and as such, its provisions bind both of them. Under the POEA-SEC, the applicable provision to resolve the issue of conflicting medical findings is Section 20-B (3), which states: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
	GR No. 180343 2014-07-09	BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES v. CRISANTE C. CONSTANTINO BRION, J.
First. The employment relationship between Constantino and the petitioners is governed by the POEA-SEC, otherwise known as the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels.[23] Thus, when the seafarer enters into an individual contract with the employer, as Constantino did in February 2002,[24] the terms and conditions of the contract must be in accordance with the POEA-SEC and shall be strictly and faithfully observed.[25] It is customary therefore that the individual contract between the seafarer and the employer (such as the contract between Constantino and the petitioners) is verified and approved by the POEA. As had been declared by the Court in an earlier ruling, the POEA-SEC is the law between the parties, together with their CBA, if there any.[26]
	GR No. 203161 2014-02-26	MARTIN K. AYUNGO v. BEAMKO SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer," and that "[t]he third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties." In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag[50] (Philippine Hammonia), the Court held that the seafarer's non-compliance with the said conflict-resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician, viz.: The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of Dumadag's contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. x x x Thus, the complaint should have been dismissed, for without a binding

PHILIPPINE HAMMONIA SHIP AGENCY v. EULOGIO V. DUMADAG