This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2014-01-22 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, appellants put forward the defense of alibi which necessarily fails in the face of positive identification. It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable.[14] Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.[15] An examination of the record would indicate that Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were unable to present a corroborating witness to support their alibi that they were working at a farm owned by a certain Boyle on the date and time of Pionio Yacapin's murder. While the witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the respective alibis of Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends and relatives who are hardly the disinterested witnesses that is required by jurisprudence. | |||||
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2014-01-15 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| However, we concur with the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the penalty of life imprisonment for carnapping originally imposed by the trial court. Life imprisonment has long been replaced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659. Furthermore, the said penalty is applicable only to the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide which is not obtaining in this case. Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[26] The appellate court correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify the carnapping into a special complex crime because the carnapping was merely an afterthought when the victim's death was already fait accompli. Thus, appellant is guilty only of simple carnapping. | |||||