This case has been cited 8 times or more.
|
2015-01-21 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
||||
| In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC's finding that the prosecution was able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter's mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda's positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime as opposed to the latter's denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that "alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter."[18] This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois, respectively since "[t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits."[19] | |||||
|
2014-06-04 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal.[15] In this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime has been adequately established by the prosecution, more particularly by the testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accused-appellant's argument that it was impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant considering that there was no evidence to show that the place where the crime occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only three meters away from the accused-appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them. Moreover, there was no distraction that could have disrupted Dagangon's attention. He even immediately identified the accused-appellant and Jerome during police investigation, and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the police beforehand that the accused-appellant was one of the suspects.[16] Positive identification by a prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial.[17] Such positive identification gains further ground in the absence of any ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely testify against an accused.[18] | |||||
|
2014-04-07 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.[39] | |||||
|
2014-01-22 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Anent the award of damages, it is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.[24] | |||||
|
2014-01-15 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Contrary to appellant's assertion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the killing of Jesus. We have consistently held that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[22] On this point, we quote with approval the Court of Appeals' discussion of this aspect of the case, to wit: The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was under the impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial court's finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.[23] (Citations omitted.) | |||||
|
2013-11-27 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| Maglente's argument is centered on the alleged uncertainty over his identification by De Leon as one of the assailants, and the absence of testimony from Mendoza and Chua's father identifying him as such. On this point, the Court has consistently abided by the rule that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility of witnesses, especially if its decision is affirmed by the CA, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case.[25] The Court finds no reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, as this is supported by the records of the case. | |||||
|
2013-09-18 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[56] | |||||
|
2013-07-24 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| "Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses for litigation; and, (6) interest, in proper cases."[37] Hence, the Court finds as proper the RTC's awards to the heirs of Abacco, as affirmed by the CA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.[38] However, the P25,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the CA must be increased to P30,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.[39] Also, as the prosecution was able to submit in evidence receipts representing the expenses incurred in connection with Abacco's burial,[40] actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00 must likewise be awarded. "In addition and in conformity with current policy [the Court] also impose[s] on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid."[41] | |||||