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RUBEN D. ANDRADA v. AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 196122 2014-11-12	JOEL B. MONANA v. MEC GLOBAL SHIPMANAGEMENT LEONEN, J.
Respondents submit that the company-designated physician Dr. Ong-Salvador's extensive assessment based on medical treatments should prevail over Dr. Vicaldo's unsupported medical opinion.[38] Respondents submit that Dr. Vicaldo only saw petitioner once as an outpatient.[39] Respondents also quote at length the 2012 case of Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency[40] where this court gave greater credence to the company-designated physician's extensive assessment over those of Dr. Vicaldo's cryptic and unsupported conclusions since Dr. Vicaldo only examined petitioner once.[41] Respondents also cite Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.[42] in that a company-designated physician's assessment must be sustained unless a third doctor's opinion is obtained.[43]
	GR No. 195832 2014-10-01	FORMERLY INC SHIPMANAGEMENT v. BENJAMIN I. ROSALES BRION, J.
This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor whose assessment should prevail. In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for the referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on the parties. We have followed this rule in a string of cases, among them, Philippine Hammonia,[21] Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corp.,[22] Santiago v. Pacbasin Shipmanagement, Inc.,[23] Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency,[24] and Masangkay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc.[25] Thus, at this point, the matter of referral pursuant to the provision of the POEA-SEC is a settled ruling.
	GR No. 200566 2014-09-17	JEBSEN MARITIME INC. v. WILFREDO E. RAVENA BRION, J.
In Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc.,[30] we categorically declared that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his rights to the benefits by substantial evidence.[31] We reiterated this ruling in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Tanawan,[32] Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc.,[33] Crew and Ship Management International Inc. v. Soria,[34] Philman Marine Agency, Inc. v. Cabanban,[35] and Manota v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation,[36] to name a few. In the case of a seafarer claiming entitlement to disability benefits under the provisions of the POEA-SEC, this burden of proof obviously lies with the seafarer.
	GR No. 181921 2014-09-17	INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES v. VICTOR M. CREER III DEL CASTILLO, J.
The Court cannot give credence to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo. Records failed to show that the said medical certification, which declares Victor's illness as work-aggravated, was supported by diagnostic tests and procedures. There was no explanation how the conclusions were arrived at. Neither was there any medical records or other sufficient proof presented that would support and validate the findings contained therein. At most, the said medical certificate is a mere summary and generalization of Victor's 'medical history and condition based on a one-time consultation. While it is true that "[p]robability and not ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings[, i]t cannot be gainsaid, however, that award of compensation and disability benefits cannot rest on speculations, presumptions and conjectures."[42]
	GR No. 209302 2014-07-09	ALONE AMAR P. TAGLE v. ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT MENDOZA, J.
Verily, the grant of total and permanent disability is not automatically awarded simply because a seafarer suffered an injury or contracted an illness after initially passing his PEME. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions, for the claimant must prove a positive proposition.[46] In this case, the burden is placed upon petitioner to present by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion, to prove causation between the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working condition. [47] In short, the onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate his claim that he is entitled to disability benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence.[48]
	GR No. 195518 2013-03-20	MAGSAYSAY MARITIME SERVICES v. EARLWIN MEINRAD ANTERO F. LAUREL MENDOZA, J.
It is elementary that this Court is not a trier of facts and this rule applies with greater force in labor cases. Questions of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve. Only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing the decisions of the CA. Indeed, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court. In exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or the court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties or, where the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions.[22] The present case clearly falls within these exceptions as the finding of the LA, on one hand, conflicts with those of the NLRC and the CA, on the other.