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DR. EMMANUEL T. VELASCO v. COA

This case has been cited 3 times or more.

	GR No. 185812 2015-01-13	MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY v. COA LEONEN, J.
Allowing the President or his or her alter ego to dictate the allowances or benefits that may be received by the officers and employees of the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group will undermine their independence. This arrangement is repugnant to their autonomy enshrined by the Constitution. As said in Velasco v. Commission on Audit,[112] the grant or regulation of the grant of productivity incentive allowance or similar benefits are in the exercise of the President's power of control over these entities. Not being under the President's power of control, the Constitutional and Fiscal Autonomy Group should be able to determine the allowances or benefits that suit the functions of the office.
	GR No. 185812 2015-01-13	MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY v. COA LEONEN, J.
As to the directors, officers, and other employees of petitioner Maritime Industry Authority who received the disallowed benefits, they are presumed to have acted in good faith when they allowed and/or received them.[148]
	GR No. 204869 2014-03-11	TECHNICAL EDUCATION v. COA CARPIO, J.
In Blaquera v. Alcala,[28] the Court no longer required the officials and employees of different government departments and agencies to refund the productivity incentive bonus they received because there was no indicia of bad faith and the disbursement was made in the honest belief that the recipients deserved the amounts. We, however, qualified this Blaquera ruling in Casal v. COA,[29] where we held the approving officials liable for the refund of the incentive award due to their patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the directives of COA. In Casal, we ruled that the officials' failure to observe the issuances amounted to gross negligence, which is inconsistent with the presumption of good faith. We applied the Casal ruling in Velasco v. COA,[30] to wit: x x x the blatant failure of the petitioners-approving officers to abide with the provisions of AO 103 and AO 161 overcame the presumption of good faith. The deliberate disregard of these issuances is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Therefore, the petitioners-approving officers are accountable for the refund of the subject incentives which they received.