This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-04-20 |
BRION, J. |
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| The petitioners bewail the rejection by the CA of the fit-to-work assessment of the company-designated physician, considering as they point out, that a company-designated physician's assessment has been upheld in recent decisions[18] of this Court, absent any contrary finding of an independent third physician jointly appointed by the parties. Moreover, they stress that in another recent ruling,[19] the Court clothed the company doctor's assessment with the presumption of regularity and legality and, therefore should be given respect. In the present case, they add, Suarez failed to rebut such presumption by moving for the appointment of a third doctor or by showing that the company doctor's findings are tainted with bias, malice or bad faith. | |||||
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2014-11-19 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Petitioners contend that the 120-day rule applied by the CA as basis for granting Michael's permanent total disability benefits was already abandoned and no longer controlling. In support of their position, petitioners cited the cases of PHILASIA Shipping Agency Corporation, Inc. v. Tomacruz,[15] citing Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.(Vergara),[16] and Santiago v. Pacbasin Shipmanagement, Inc.(Pacbasin),[17] where it was clarified that the temporary total disability period of 120 days may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days. Thus, petitioners claim that the seafarer's cause of action arises only after the lapse of a maximum 240-day period. | |||||
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2014-10-01 |
BRION, J. |
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| This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor whose assessment should prevail. In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for the referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on the parties. We have followed this rule in a string of cases, among them, Philippine Hammonia,[21] Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corp.,[22] Santiago v. Pacbasin Shipmanagement, Inc.,[23] Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency,[24] and Masangkay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc.[25] Thus, at this point, the matter of referral pursuant to the provision of the POEA-SEC is a settled ruling. | |||||
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2013-06-26 |
BRION, J. |
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| Given the circumstances under which Dumadag pursued his claim, especially the fact that he caused the non-referral to a third doctor, Dr. Dacanay's fit-to-work certification must be upheld. In Santiago v. Pacbasin Ship Management, Inc.,[35] the Court declared: "[t]here was no agreement on a third doctor who shall examine him anew and whose finding shall be final and binding. x x x [T]his Court is left without choice but to uphold the certification made by Dr. Lim with respect to Santiago's disability." | |||||
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2012-11-12 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Consequently, despite the lapse of the 120-day period, petitioner was still considered to be under a state of temporary total disability at the time he filed his complaint on August 29, 2003, 184 days from the date of his medical repatriation which is well-within the 240-day applicable period in this case. Hence, he cannot be said to have acquired a cause of action for total and permanent disability benefits.[30] To stress, the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the same, he fails to make such declaration.[31] | |||||