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DANIEL M. ISON v. CREWSERVE

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

2015-12-09
PEREZ, J.
Section 32-A of the same Contract names certain occupational diseases and the basic conditions that must be met in order for the resulting disability or death to be compensable. A perusal of said provision would show that malignant melanoma is not one of those expressly identified in the list of occupational diseases. Nevertheless, it can be inferred from Section 20-B(4) that the enumeration in Section 32-A is by no means exclusive. The seafarer even enjoys a presumption of compensability for unlisted illnesses in case of failure of the employer to present adequate evidence to the contrary. As no third doctor, whose assessment was supposed to be final, had been jointly appointed by the petitioners and the respondent as provided in Section 20-B(3), there is no other recourse for the Court but to reexamine the merits of the medical evaluations respectively presented by the parties' doctors[60] vis-a-vis Cristino's work and his illness.
2015-12-07
DEL CASTILLO, J.
The Court also takes notice of the fact that Beja's medical condition cannot be solely attributable to accidents. His injury could have possibly been caused by other factors such as chronic wear and tear[35] and aging.[36] Thus, the NLRC's conclusion that the tear and injury on Beja's knee was caused by an accident on board had no factual basis but was anchored merely on speculation. The Court cannot, however, rest its rulings on mere speculation and presumption.[37]
2015-11-25
MENDOZA, J.
Jurisprudence is indeed replete with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician's findings which should form the basis of any disability claim of the seafarer.[24] It is worthy to note, however, that neither the claimant nor the labor tribunals and the courts are automatically bound by the medical report issued by the company-designated physician. The inherent merit of the said report would still have to be weighed and duly considered by the Court.[25]
2014-09-03
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.
Section 20(B)(3)[15] of the POEA-SEC provides that "[i]f a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment [of the company-designated doctor], a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer," and "[t]he third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties." In this case, there was no third doctor appointed by both parties whose decision would be binding on the parties. Hence, it is up to the labor tribunal and the courts to evaluate and weigh the merits of the medical reports of the company-designated doctor and the seafarer's doctor.[16] The Labor Arbiter did not give probative value to the medical report issued by petitioner's doctor primarily because there was no evidence of tests and examinations conducted to support his medical report. On the other hand, the NLRC ruled that "[t]he findings of [petitioner's] doctor, who gave him Grade 1 Disability rating is more appropriate and applicable to the injury suffered by [petitioner]."[17] The Court of Appeals gave more credence to the findings of the company-designated doctor, which were supported by multiple tests and examinations on petitioner, compared to the medical report of petitioner's doctor which was not supported by adequate tests and examinations.
2013-06-26
BRION, J.
Generally, this Court looks with disfavor at quitclaims executed by employees for being contrary to public policy.[44] Where the person making the waiver, however, has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding of its terms and with the payment of credible and reasonable consideration, we have no option but to recognize the transaction to be valid and binding.[45]
2013-02-26
PERALTA, J.
In the recent case of Daniel M. Ison v. Crewserve, Inc., et al.,[30] although ruling against the claimant therein, the Court upheld the above-cited view and evaluated the findings of the seafarer's doctors vis-à-vis the findings of the company-designated physician.  A seafarer is, thus, not precluded from consulting a physician of his choice.  Consequently, the findings of petitioner's own physician can be the basis in determining whether he is entitled to his disability claims.
2012-12-05
PEREZ, J.
His entitlement to sickness allowance and disability compensation thus discounted, attorney's fees are not likewise due to Calawigan who filed his complaint on 4 July 2005 or even prior to Dr. Mendiola's assessment of his disability. Having requested disembarkation/resigned from employment, Calawigan also executed a 29 June 2005 Release and Quitclaim, acknowledging his receipt from LISI of the sum of P39,441.32 by way of salaries and benefits.[42] Although releases and quitclaims executed by employees are commonly frowned upon as being contrary to public policy, the transaction evidenced thereby is recognized as a valid and binding undertaking where the consideration therefor is credible and reasonable and the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof.[43] No defect in respondent's waivers was proven in the instant case. Thus, while we sympathize with Calawigan's plight, we are, constrained to disallow the sickness allowance, disability benefits and attorney's fees awarded by the CA.