This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-09-29 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| It should be emphasized that in the instant case, the transfer of SPPC's real property to respondent was pursuant to their approved plan of merger. In a merger of two existing corporations, one of the corporations survives and continues the business, while the other is dissolved, and all its rights, properties, and liabilities are acquired by the surviving corporation.[21] Although there is a dissolution of the absorbed or merged corporations, there is no winding up of their affairs or liquidation of their assets because the surviving corporation automatically acquires all their rights, privileges, and powers, as well as their liabilities.[22] Here, SPPC ceased to have any legal personality and respondent PSPC stepped into everything that was SPPC's, pursuant to the law and the terms of their Plan of Merger. | |||||
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2013-08-27 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| In the case at bench, however, the Motion to Dismiss was denied. It is well-entrenched that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.[37] Therefore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss is not appealable, not even via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The only remedy for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is a special civil action for certiorari showing that such denial was made with grave abuse of discretion.[38] | |||||
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2012-04-18 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| As shown in the previously cited cases, this Court has time and again upheld the principle that a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license may still sue before the Philippine courts a Filipino or a Philippine entity that had derived some benefit from their contractual arrangement because the latter is considered to be estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after it had acknowledged the said corporation by entering into a contract with it.[26] | |||||
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2012-01-25 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| All these allegations are specific matters to be resolved by this Court in determining the overriding issue of the case at bar: whether the Court of Appeals correctly granted Candice's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on its finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 2, 2006 and April 7, 2006 Orders. In other words, the main issue to be determined by this Court is whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in the RTC's order to reinstate the notice of levy on attachment in TCT No. R-22522. "Grave abuse of discretion" signifies "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law."[21] | |||||
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2011-11-28 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| [S]uch capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.[16] | |||||