This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2011-06-29 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| As we explained in Bautista v. Sandiganbayan[15]: Indeed, Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not, however, indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.[16] (Underscoring supplied.) | |||||
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2010-03-09 |
CORONA, J. |
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| (4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.[17] (emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2006-01-31 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| (a) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (b) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public position; (c) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; (d) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to such parties; and (e) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. [3] From the foregoing, it may be inferred that there are two modes of committing the offense, thus: (1) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the government; or (2) the public officer gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[4] An accused may be charged under either mode[5] or under both should both modes concur.[6] | |||||
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2000-08-14 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago,[10] as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.[11] In the instant case, we find that petitioner, in issuing the certification, did not cause any undue injury to the Government. She also did not give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to Tanduay. Neither did petitioner display manifest partiality to Tanduay nor act | |||||