This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2009-04-24 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The lone testimony of a witness, if credible, is sufficient.[21] The Court cannot ignore the fact that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Offril's lone testimony as credible, "clear, unequivocal and rang with truth."[22] The Court has repeatedly held that it will not interfere with the trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to do so because it heard the witnesses testify before it and had every opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment on the witness stand.[23] | |||||
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2004-06-08 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| Treachery was properly appreciated by the trial court. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[19] The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberately without warning done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.[20] Carlos Dueñas was completely unarmed and totally unaware of what Escote wanted or planned to do. He was suddenly shot by Escote, causing a gunshot wound which resulted to his death. | |||||
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2003-07-17 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Conspiracy, aptly alleged in the amended information, has attended the commission of the crime. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decide to commit it.[13] The prosecution has narrated in detail how the appellants and their co-accused have agreed to a common design to rob and kill the victim. The subsequent discovery of the lifeless body of the victim and the recovery by the police of the victim's belongings in the possession of the appellants would later confirm the execution of plan to rob and kill the victim. Where conspiracy is shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each accused becomes secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all the conspirators.[14] In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is not necessary to identify who among the conspirators have inflicted the stab wound on the victim.[15] | |||||
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2001-03-16 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The Court has repeatedly held that it will not interfere with the trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which had been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.[8] The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to do so because it heard the witnesses testify before it and had every opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment on the witness stand.[9] | |||||
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2001-03-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime.[22] It may be inferred from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the crime which point to a joint design, concerted action and commonality of sentiment or interest.[23] Once proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation. In this case, the prosecution's evidence indubitably shows that appellant acted in concert with Edmund and Rene to kill Delara. First, while Rene and Edmund were hacking and stabbing the victim, appellant was with them, pounding him with a concrete hollow block. Evidently, appellant was performing overt acts, which directly or indirectly contributed to the execution of the crime. Second, after the victim somehow managed to fend off his attackers and flee, all three attackers pursued him. This is a transparent manifestation of their common sentiment to inflict harm and injury upon Delara. Clearly, the aforementioned acts point to a common purpose, concert of action, and community of interest among the assailants. In conspiracy, it is immaterial who inflicted the fatal blows. A conspirator, no matter how minimal his participation, is as guilty as the principal perpetrator of the crime. | |||||
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2001-02-05 |
PARDO, J. |
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| Treachery is present when the offender commits any crime against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.[25] | |||||
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2001-01-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In the instant case, we note that petitioner fails to point out any matter which may have been overlooked or misconstrued by the trial court and the appellate court in their respective assessments of Miraflor Salvero's testimony. Petitioner's main contention that she was biased against him is merely grounded on her common law relationship to the brother of the deceased. Petitioner presented no concrete proof to show her testimony was biased. We have held that the witness' relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.[12] No legal provision disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying if they are competent. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label Miraflor Salvero's testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. This Court has taken cognizance of the fact that in many instances, crimes are committed with just the victim's kinfolk as witnesses.[13] Note further that the records are bare of any showing that Miraflor Salvero was motivated by any ill motive to testify falsely against petitioner. Where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, his or her testimony should be given full faith and credit.[14] We find no reason therefore, to disturb the findings of the trial court in which respondent court concurred, respecting the credibility of prosecution eyewitness Miraflor Salvero. | |||||