This case has been cited 11 times or more.
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2008-01-29 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| AAA's testimony is entitled to great weight in contrast to appellant's bare denials. "Denial is a negative, self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence."[18] Besides, neither AAA nor her family had any ill-motive to falsely testify and impute a serious crime against the appellant who is a close relative. | |||||
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2003-08-07 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In People v. Fraga,[31] we held that "although the rape of a person under eighteen (18) years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim's mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant x x x because his relationship was not what was alleged in the information. What was alleged was that he is the stepfather of the complainant." The filiation or kinship with the accused must be alleged in the information as part of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[32] Therefore, the failure to accurately allege the relationship between appellant and his victim in the information bars his conviction of rape in its qualified form.[33] The appellant, having been referred to as the stepfather of the victim in the information, is thus auspiciously spared from the supreme punishment of death by this technical flaw.[34] | |||||
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2001-04-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The contention has no merit. Where an alleged rape victim says she was sexually abused, she says almost all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her person, provided her testimony meets the test of credibility.[29] For no woman would allow an examination of her private parts or go through the humiliation of a trial unless she has actually been so brutalized that she desires justice for her suffering.[30] | |||||
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2001-03-27 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In contrast to complainant's credible and consistent testimony, accused-appellant could only offer the defenses of denial and alibi. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[43] It is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater weight than the testimony of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters. Between the positive declarations of a prosecution witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.[44] | |||||
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2001-03-26 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| This, too, has no merit. The trial court correctly gave full faith and credence to Juvelyn's testimony rather than to the evidence for the defense. Accused-appellant was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime by Juvelyn, who was almost 12 years old at the time of the incident, having been born on April 26, 1977 per certification of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. 2).[37] We have ruled that testimonies of child victims of rape are generally accorded full weight and credit. A young girl's revelation that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give the details of her ignominy, cannot be dismissed as a mere concoction,[38] especially if she has no ill motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant.[39] | |||||
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2001-03-14 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Nonetheless, we hold that accused-appellant cannot be held liable for qualified rape and sentenced to death. Under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed for the commission of the crime of rape if the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.[44] In these cases, the allegation in the complaints that accused-appellant is the stepfather of complainant is not correct. For accused-appellant to be considered the stepfather of the complainant, he must be legally married to complainant's mother.[45] The evidence in these cases shows, however, that accused-appellant and complainant's mother were not legally married but that they lived only in common-law relation.[46] On the other hand, although the rape of a person under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim's mother is also punishable by death, this fact must be alleged in the complaint or information so as to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.[47] This was not done in the cases at bar. | |||||
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2001-02-19 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| This contention lacks merit. It is settled that in cases of rape (including acts of lasciviousness), the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.[31] Such is the testimony of rape victims who are young, immature, and have no motive to falsely testify against the accused.[32] | |||||
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2001-02-06 |
PARDO, J. |
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| Nor can we sustain accused-appellant's claim that there was no force or intimidation employed by him. In People v. Fraga,[15] we held:"The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to the sexual assault. It is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. Indeed, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance." In this case, accused covered Stecy's mouth and threatened that he would kill her if she cried for help. She was abused in a place where she was unfamiliar. The nausea and fear prevented Stecy from putting up a resistance. However, lack of physical resistance can not be considered consent. | |||||
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2000-10-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The trial court imposed the death penalty on accused-appellant based on its finding that Divina Corsanis, the victim's mother, is the common-law spouse of accused-appellant. While the trial court correctly found accused-appellant to be the common law spouse of the victim's mother, the Information, however, did not allege accused-appellant as the common-law spouse of Divina, but that he was the step-father and guardian of the victim. Hence, the trial court cannot properly impose the death penalty considering that his being the common-law spouse of Divina Corsanis was not alleged in the Information. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not alleged, a qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information. It must be properly pleaded in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.[9] Specifically, in People v. Fraga,[10] this Court held that "(a)lthough the rape of a person under eighteen (18) years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim's mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant x x x because his relationship was not what was alleged in the informations. What was alleged was that he is the stepfather of the complainant." | |||||
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2000-06-29 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| It must not be forgotten that the crimes involved in these cases are rapes in which the victim is below 12 years of age so that the lack of consent of the victim to have sexual intercourse with accused-appellant is irrelevant.[24] | |||||
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2000-06-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Nor can we sustain accused-appellant's claim that there was no force or intimidation employed by him in this case. In People v. Fraga,[22] we held:The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to the sexual assault. It is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. Indeed, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. | |||||