This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-12-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of their contractors to prove that the latter are legitimate independent contractors. Such registration is not conclusive of the status of a legitimate contractor; rather, it merely prevents the presumption of being a labor-only contractor from arising. Indeed, to determine whether labor-only contracting exists, the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case must be considered.[77] | |||||
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2012-10-10 |
REYES, J. |
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| Finally, a finding that a contractor is a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and the "labor-only" contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer.[29] The former becomes solidarily liable for all the rightful claims of the employees.[30] The petitioner therefore, being the principal employer and Lancer, being the labor-only contractor, are solidarily liable for respondents' unpaid money claims. | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The test of independent contractorship is "whether one claiming to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the employer, except only as to the results of the work."[43] In San Miguel Corporation v. Semillano,[44] the Court laid down the criteria in determining the existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship, to wit: x x x [W]hether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises, tools, appliances, materials, and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment.[45] | |||||
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2010-12-15 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In San Miguel Corporation v. Vicente B. Semillano, Nelson Mondejas, Jovito Remada, Alilgilan Multi-Purpose Coop (AMPCO), and Merlyn N. Policarpio,[19] this Court explained: Despite the fact that the service contracts contain stipulations which are earmarks of independent contractorship, they do not make it legally so. The language of a contract is neither determinative nor conclusive of the relationship between the parties. Petitioner SMC and AMPCO cannot dictate, by a declaration in a contract, the character of AMPCO's business, that is, whether as labor-only contractor, or job contractor. AMPCO's character should be measured in terms of, and determined by, the criteria set by statute. | |||||