This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-10-07 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In view of the foregoing, the Court lends more credence to Saso's allegation that he reported to 88 Aces on April 23, 2010 or within three days from his repatriation in compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement and, that it is actually respondents who failed to fulfill their part of the obligation when they did not provide him with a timely post-employment medical examination. As held, the absence of a post-employment medical examination cannot be used to defeat a seafarer's claim when the failure to subject him to such requirement was not due to his fault but to the inadvertence or deliberate refusal of the employer.[37] Hence, contrary to the rulings of the NLRC and the CA, Saso cannot be considered to have forfeited his right to claim compensation and benefits. | |||||
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2015-04-20 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo,[18] we carved another exception, not found in the law, i.e. when the employer refuses to refer the seafarer to a company-designated physician: What if the seafarer reported to his employer but despite his request for a post-employment medical examination, the employer, who is mandated to provide this service under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, did not do so? Would the absence of a post-employment medical examination be taken against the seafarer? | |||||
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2014-11-12 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| As elucidated in Canuel, the foregoing liberal approach was applied in Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated v. Candava,[67] Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo,[68] and Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC,[69] wherein the Court had previously allowed the recovery of death benefits even if the seafarers in those cases had died after repatriation, given that there was proof of a clear causal connection between their work and the illness which was contracted in the course of employment, and their eventual death. The converse conclusion was reached in the cases of Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin[70] (Gau Sheng), Spouses Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp.[71] (Spouses Aya-ay, Sr.), Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc.,[72] Prudential Shipping and Management Corp. v. Sta. Rita[73] (Prudential), and Ortega v. CA[74] (Ortega), since the element of work-relatedness had not been established. All in all, the sense gathered from these cases, as pointed out in Canuel, is that it is crucial to determine whether the death of the deceased was reasonably connected with his work, or whether the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease that resulted in the seafarer's death. If the injury or illness is the proximate cause, or at least increased the risk of his death for which compensation is sought, recovery may be had for said death, or for that matter, for the injury or illness. Thus, in Seagull Shipmanagement and Trans., Inc. v. NLRC,[75] the Court significantly observed that: Even assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him of compensation benefits. For what matters is that his work had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death. Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease. [76] (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) | |||||
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2014-10-13 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| The Court similarly took into account the work-relatedness element in granting the death benefits claim in Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo,[68] a 2010 case decided under the 1996 POEA-SEC which operated under parameters identical to the 1984 POEA-SEC. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of that ruling: It was established on record that before the late Lutero Remo signed his last contract with private respondents as Cook-Steward of the vessel "M/T Captain Mitsos L," he was required to undergo a series of medical examinations. Yet, he was declared "fit to work" by private respondents' company designated-physician. On April 19, 1999, Remo was discharged from his vessel after he was hospitalized in Fujairah for atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure. His death on August 28, 2000, even if it occurred months after his repatriation, due to hypertensive cardio-vascular disease, could clearly have been work related. Declared as "fit to work" at the time of hiring, and hospitalized while on service on account of "atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure," his eventual death due to "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease" could only be work related. The death due to "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease" could in fact be traced to Lutero Remo's being the "Cook-Steward." As Cook-Steward of an ocean going vessel, Remo had no choice but to prepare and eat hypertension inducing food, a kind of food that eventually caused his "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease," a disease which in turn admittedly caused his death. | |||||
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2014-09-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| I hereby declare and confirm that I have no other claim against said vessel, her Master, Owners, Operators and Agents and I hereby discharge and release them from any other liability whatsoever[.] I further certify and confirm that I worked on board the said vessel under normal conditions and that I have not contracted or suffered any illness or injury from my work and that I was discharged in good and perfect health.[11] | |||||
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2013-08-13 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| In our jurisprudence, quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor.[96] In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo,[97] this Court elucidated on the following requirements for a waiver of rights to be valid:To be valid, a Deed of Release, Waiver and/or Quitclaim must meet the following requirements: (1) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (2) that the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Courts have stepped in to invalidate questionable transactions, especially where there is clear proof that a waiver, for instance, was obtained from an unsuspecting or a gullible person, or where the agreement or settlement was unconscionable on its face. A quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of a worker's rights, and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. Moreover, a quitclaim in which the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to the pursuit of a worker's legitimate claim. | |||||
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2013-06-26 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| The foregoing facts, coupled with Joselito's failing health, negate his voluntariness in executing his complaints, motions to dismiss, and release documents and give life to the truism that "necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them."[55] Besides, as a rule, quitclaims, waivers, or releases are looked upon with disfavor and are largely ineffective to bar recovery of the full measure of a worker's rights, and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel.[56] This is especially true in this case where instead of promoting the orderly settlement of disputes; petitioners' acts encouraged the circumvention of the proper legal procedures and the evasion of the payment of legitimate claims to a seafarer succumbing to a life-threatening disease. Therefore the settlements that Joselito entered into must be struck down for being contrary to public policy. | |||||