This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-08-12 |
JARDELEZA, J. |
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| Contrary to the DARAB's conclusion, therefore, a conversion or exemption clearance from the DAR would be superfluous. In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[53] we explained: It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. As held in Republic v. Estonilo,[54] only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to such use without undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually, directly and exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the CARP.[55] More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for public use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.[56] Hence, they are outside the coverage of the CARP and it logically follows that they are also beyond the conversion authority of the DAR. | |||||
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2015-07-28 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Judicial functions involve the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertaking to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.[14] Quasi-judicial functions apply to the actions and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action, in their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature.[15] Ministerial functions are those which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.[16] | |||||
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2011-12-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.[14] However, such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.[15] In [Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor],[16] citing People v. Cuaresma,[17] the Court held: This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2011-06-15 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its primary purpose is to keep an inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [25] | |||||
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2011-06-15 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [26] | |||||
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2011-06-15 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [27] | |||||
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2011-02-23 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[12] a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit: Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following pronouncements: | |||||