This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-04-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections[18] and De Castro v. Commission on Elections,[19] where the Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes."[20] | |||||
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2013-01-22 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Moreover, after having participated and presented her evidence at the May 27, 2011 preliminary hearing, Chato cannot now be heard to complain that the proceedings therein did not amount to a full blown trial on the merits required in the case of Tolentino v. COMELEC[43] for weighing the integrity of ballots. | |||||
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2011-10-04 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| This principle was reiterated in the more recent consolidated cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, [20] and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, [21] where the Court held that in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC "must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes." | |||||