This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2014-11-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| This Court cannot give weight to Ejercito's representation that his signature on the advertising contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only for the first time in this petition for certiorari. It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court.[91] It would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow Ejercito to raise an issue that was not brought up before the COMELEC.[92] While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that elementary considerations of due process require that a party be duly apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered.[93] | |||||
|
2012-12-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| One final note, the matters raised by petitioner mainly involves factual controversies, which are clearly beyond the ambit of this Court. To be sure, the review of factual matters is not the province of this Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of factual issues.[25] | |||||
|
2012-06-13 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| On the same ground that petitions under Rule 45 must not involve questions of fact, the petitioners' prayer for this Court to admit what they claimed to be newly discovered evidence is hereby denied. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of factual issues.[13] While the Rules of Court allows the introduction by parties of newly-discovered evidence, as in motions for new trial under Rule 37, these are not to be presented for the first time during an appeal. In addition, the term "newly-discovered evidence" has a specific definition under the law. Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.[14] | |||||
|
2012-02-01 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| Thus, the question of whether or not petitioner's properties could be covered by the CARP has not yet been resolved. Until such determination, it follows that petitioner's landholdings cannot be the proper subject of acquisition and eventual distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, these involve factual controversies, which are clearly beyond the ambit of this Court. Verily, the review of factual matters is not the province of this Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of factual issues.[48] | |||||