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MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. NLRC

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 207328 2015-04-20	WILHELMSEN-SMITH BELL MANNING v. ALLAN SUAREZ BRION, J.
The petitioners bewail the rejection by the CA of the fit-to-work assessment of the company-designated physician, considering as they point out, that a company-designated physician's assessment has been upheld in recent decisions[18] of this Court, absent any contrary finding of an independent third physician jointly appointed by the parties. Moreover, they stress that in another recent ruling,[19] the Court clothed the company doctor's assessment with the presumption of regularity and legality and, therefore should be given respect. In the present case, they add, Suarez failed to rebut such presumption by moving for the appointment of a third doctor or by showing that the company doctor's findings are tainted with bias, malice or bad faith.
	GR No. 198097 2014-07-30	STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION v. SPS. MARGARITO B. DELALAMON AND PRISCILA A. DELALAMON REYES, J.
The fact that Margarito passed his PEME cannot excuse his willful concealment nor can it preclude the petitioners from rejecting his disability claims. PEME is not exploratory and does not allow the employer to discover any and all pre-existing medical condition with which the seafarer is suffering and for which he may be presently taking medication. The PEME is nothing more than a summary examination of the seafarer's physiological condition;[34] it merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service" and it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. The "fit to work" declaration in the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.[35]
	GR No. 209302 2014-07-09	ALONE AMAR P. TAGLE v. ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT MENDOZA, J.
Thus, for disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B)(4) of the POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to simply establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.[43]
	GR No. 204076 2013-12-04	JEBSENS MARITIME v. ELENO A. BABOL MENDOZA, J.
On May 15, 2012, the CA dismissed the petition. Echoing the findings of the NLRC and the LA, it held that the nature and circumstances of respondent's work caused his illness or at least aggravated any pre-existing condition he might have, hence compensable.[8] It gave weight to the findings of the NLRC and the LA that the risk factors as relayed by the company-designated physician were attendant in respondent's case, such as: (1) his diet while on board which was high in salt-cured fish and preserved foods; (2) and his exposure to toxic materials, smoke, and diesel fumes while working for the petitioners in various capacities for almost two decades. Having found a link between respondent's working conditions and the disease, it concluded that the claims deserved merit in accordance with this Court's ruling in Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission[9] where it was recognized as sufficient, in order to successfully claim the benefits under the contract, that the work has been proven as contributory, even in a small degree, to the development of a worker's disease.
	GR No. 194362 2013-06-26	PHILIPPINE HAMMONIA SHIP AGENCY v. EULOGIO V. DUMADAG BRION, J.
Whatever his reasons might have been, Dumadag's disregard of the conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot and should not be tolerated and allowed to stand, lest it encourage a similar defiance. We stress in this respect that we have yet to come across a case where the parties referred conflicting assessments of a seafarer's disability to a third doctor since the procedure was introduced by the POEA-SEC in 2000 whether the Court's ruling in a particular case upheld the assessment of the company-designated physician, as in Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division)[33] and similar other cases, or sustained the opinion of the seafarer's chosen physician as in HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar,[34] cited by the CA, and other cases similarly resolved. The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties' level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court.
	GR No. 195518 2013-03-20	MAGSAYSAY MARITIME SERVICES v. EARLWIN MEINRAD ANTERO F. LAUREL MENDOZA, J.
The petitioners cannot successfully invoke the case of Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. NLRC[39] to insulate themselves from liability for disability benefits. The said case is not applicable. In that case, a causal connection between the nature of claimant's employment as assistant housekeeping manager on board the vessel and his lymphoma, or the fact that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions was not established. The petitioner, through the medical report of its company-designated physician, was able to sufficiently explain the basis in concluding that the claimant's illness was not work-related. It was shown that the claimant had not been exposed to any carcinogenic fumes or to any viral infection in his workplace. In addition, he was declared fit to resume sea duties. No contrary medical finding was presented by him. Thus, it was held that he was not entitled to disability benefits.
	GR No. 175491 2012-12-10	CREW v. JINA T. SORIA MENDOZA, J.
The Court emphasizes that Its commitment to the cause of labor does not prevent it from finding for the employer when it is right and just. The Court is always mindful that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.[34]
	GR No. 191606 2012-08-01	DAMASO R. CASOMO v. CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT PEREZ, J.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission[10] schools us, thus: For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted. (Emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 185412 2011-11-16	GILBERT QUIZORA v. DENHOLM CREW MANAGEMENT MENDOZA, J.
The 2000 POEA-SEC defines "work-related injury" as "injury[ies] resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment" and "work-related illness" as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.[5]