This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2011-01-26 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of a party's complete personality profile, information coming from persons with personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.[23] | |||||
|
2011-01-17 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,[15] the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner's marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayag's evaluation which became the trial court's basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link between petitioner's acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.[16] | |||||
|
2010-12-08 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| Ting v. Velez-Ting[23] and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo[24] squarely met the issue and laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. | |||||
|
2010-12-01 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribel's supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent and incurable. Maribel's attitudes were merely mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations which did not amount to psychological incapacity, said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short of mental illness sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital obligations.[12] | |||||