This case has been cited 5 times or more.
|
2013-08-19 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| We emphasize that the appeal to the CA was brought not by Daabay but by Coca-Cola, and was limited to the issue of whether or not the award of retirement benefits in favor of Daabay was proper. Insofar as CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN was concerned, the correctness of the NLRC's pronouncement on the legality of Daabay's dismissal was no longer an issue, even beyond the appellate court's authority to modify. In Andaya v. NLRC,[26] the Court emphasized that a party who has not appealed from a decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.[27] Further, we explained in Yano v. Sanchez,[28] that the entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that he can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised below only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor.[29] Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal.[30] Considering that Daabay had not yet appealed from the NLRC's Resolution to the CA, his plea for the modification of the NLRC's findings was then misplaced. For the Court to review all matters that are raised in the petition would be tolerant of what Daabay was barred to do before the appellate court. | |||||
|
2012-09-26 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| As to the respondent's prayer, we can no longer examine the CA's deletion of the monetary amounts awarded by the RTC since the respondent did not appeal from the CA decision. "[A] party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified."[45] The established exceptions to this rule such as "(1) errors affecting the lower court's jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors"[46] do not apply to this case. | |||||
|
2012-04-24 |
SERENO, J. |
||||
| Finally, petitioners insist that while they were able to sufficiently establish their case by the required evidentiary standard, respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove their defenses by substantial evidence and to show that respondents exercised extraordinary diligence as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[84] This Court has squarely passed upon this contention in Yano v. Sanchez,[85] to wit: The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. | |||||
|
2011-11-15 |
SERENO, J. |
||||
| We held in Yano v. Sanchez[68] that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ. | |||||
|
2010-09-07 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.[124] A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do. | |||||