This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-03-26 |
REYES, J. |
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| On October 4, 2012, PAGCOR filed its Reply[43] in G.R. No. 199528, admitting the Joint Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, but still reiterating all its arguments and urging that the main issue in its petitions, whether Judge Jurado gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writs of preliminary injunction despite the respondents' lack of a clear and unquestioned legal right to continue operating a casino, must still be resolved, for the reason that the controversy below is capable of repetition yet evading review, citing Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo[44].[45] PAGCOR insisted that the RTC's amended order is a full adjudication of the respondents' complaints, as a result of which Judge Jurado effectively amended PAGCOR's Charter and took over its licensing mandate when he virtually ordered it to extend their franchises. PAGCOR also argued that a motion for reconsideration therefrom would have been entirely futile, citing Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan[46],[47] to wit:The rule [requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration] is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex-parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[48] (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2014-02-03 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.[22] we had the occasion to settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[23] is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC[24] where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65[25] which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.[26] Under exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,[27] the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court's sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that 'no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.' Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the court's sound discretion."[28] | |||||
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2013-08-07 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| According to the Fifth Division, citing Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,[11] consolidation is proper inasmuch as the subject matter of the charges in both the Abalos and Neri cases revolved around the same ZTE-NBN Project. And following the movant's line, the anti-graft court stated that consolidation would allow the government to save unnecessary expenses, avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court without violating the parties' rights. | |||||
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2012-08-22 |
REYES, J. |
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| The Republic relies on the CA resolution granting its motion for extension of time and upon the strength of the substantial merits of its petition. The Republic also invokes Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,[21] where the Court ruled that absent a prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject to the Court's sound discretion. | |||||
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2012-02-29 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,[22] we ruled that the deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an extension of time to file such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be allowed, subject to this Court's sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases. | |||||
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2011-12-13 |
BRION, J. |
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| On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders' meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPI's authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein the sequestered Class 'A' shares of stock."[22] Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as previously scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and the increase in ETPI's authorized capital stock was "unanimously approved."[23] From this ruling, Africa went to this Court via a petition for certiorari[24] docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africa's petition). | |||||
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2010-11-17 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[16] There are, however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,[17] it was written: The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[18] (underscoring supplied) | |||||