This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-01-27 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In Vidar v. People,[16] the Court laid down the following: In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is positive or derivative, the Court has adopted the totality of circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into consideration: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.[17] | |||||
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2013-08-28 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| The trial court noted that during AAA's cross-examination, her testimony bore the hallmarks of truth, as she remained consistent on material points. We find no reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of the credibility of AAA's testimony. The trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. "[T]he assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court."[28] | |||||
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2012-03-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| We also find no reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. Vidar v. People[48] declares that "the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts - and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court."[49] | |||||
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2011-03-14 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Additionally, one thing which bolsters the prosecution witnesses' credibility is the fact that they had no motive to lie against the appellant. Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.[44] In the present case, there was no shred of evidence to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were impelled by improper motives to implicate appellant in the crime. | |||||
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2011-01-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Thus, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court when it gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence "x x x that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination."[24] This rule is even more binding and conclusive when affirmed by the appellate court.[25] | |||||
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2010-11-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The Court is not convinced. After a careful perusal of the records of this case, this Court finds no plausible reason to question the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence "that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination."[41] This rule is even more binding and conclusive when the trial court's assessment is affirmed by the appellate court.[42] | |||||
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2010-10-13 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Accused-appellant made an effort to show that witness Roger Lara was motivated to testify in favor of the prosecution as he had been asked to by the relatives of the victim, Edwin Lucas. This endeavor of accused-appellant deserves short shrift. Whether or not the victim's relatives contacted Roger Lara or asked him to testify in the present case is immaterial, as Lara was merely reiterating what he had stated in his sworn statement executed on the day of the killings. For personal motive on the part of a witness to testify against the accused to be appreciated as showing bias, its presence should be supported by satisfactory proof.[21] Accused-appellant has failed to show that Lara was impelled by improper motive to testify, thus Lara's testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. | |||||