This case has been cited 21 times or more.
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2013-06-05 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Be that as it may, procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[37] Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.[38] | |||||
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2012-01-25 |
REYES, J. |
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| The petitioners ought to be reminded that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[22] | |||||
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2011-11-16 |
REYES, A., J. |
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| The petitioners ought to be reminded that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[9] | |||||
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2010-11-22 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of the Rules of Court, and their relaxation or suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[25] Further, a bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" will not suffice to override a stringent implementation of the rules.[26] | |||||
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2010-10-20 |
BRION, J. |
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| An exception to this rule is our ruling in Lazaro v. Court of Appeals [37] where we held that the strict enforcement of the rules of procedure may be relaxed in exceptionally meritorious cases: x x x Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. The Court reiterates that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, "have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. x x x The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice x x x. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions." Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the Court held that the said rules may be relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases. [Emphasis supplied.] | |||||
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2010-06-16 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Withal, this Court must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.[33] Indeed, in no uncertain terms, this Court has held that the said Rules may be relaxed only in ''exceptionally meritorious cases."[34] Petitioners have failed to show that this case is one of the exceptions. | |||||
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2009-08-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We have invariably pronounced that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of Procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness, as well as to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed, simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive reasons, when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Rules of Procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of justice. We have held that the rules may be relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious cases."[41] | |||||
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2009-07-31 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| Now as to the invocation by petitioner of substantial justice which warrants the allowance of his appeal, the pronouncement by this Court in the case of Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,[29] is apt: We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. "Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."[30] | |||||
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2009-07-03 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Even if the Rules of Court may not apply in the proceedings before the DARAB, the CA was correct in pointing out that the Revised Rules of the DARAB itself impose a fifteen-day reglementary period to appeal. Since the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, the failure of petitioners to so perfect their appeal rendered the questioned decision final and executory.[45] This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law, but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.[46] | |||||
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2009-03-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Thus, we have no recourse but to affirm the Order of the Court of Appeals dismissing Erlinda's appeal. Pursuant to Section 1(c),[15] Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or that of the appellee, may dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees.[16] Pertinently, this Court's ruling in Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals[17] is instructive:With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate [court] docket fees was belatedly made four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal except to order its dismissal, as it rightfully did. Thus, the September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the realm of finality and became executory by operation of law.[18] (Stress supplied.) Finally, we hold that the RTC erred in giving due course to the notice of appeal, supposedly in the interest of substantial justice. The bare invocation of the phrase, "the interest of substantial justice," is not a magic spell that will automatically allow the Court to suspend procedural rules, despite the jurisdictional bar. The rules may be relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.[19] In this case, the messenger's alleged inadvertence to secure a postal money order for the appellate court docket fees[20] is not a meritorious reason to justify an exception in our jurisprudence.[21] | |||||
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2008-12-08 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.[28] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[4] The Court reiterates that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the Court held that the said rules may be relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious cases."[5] This case is not one of those. | |||||
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2007-09-27 |
TINGA, J, |
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| All told, the procedural lapses of the instant petition cannot be ignored. The doctrines of judicial hierarchy and res judicata are not meaningless procedural rules because they are grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[27] Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.[28] | |||||
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2007-04-02 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Petitioner is correct in pointing out that the Court has ample powers to relax the rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice and in order to allow a litigant to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint. However, concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain its failure to comply with the rules.[16] Said rules may be relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.[17] | |||||
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2005-09-13 |
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| Private respondent in his Comment contends that: petitioners are represented by private counsel who is presumed to be competent and diligent in his task and is duty bound to know the correct and full amount of docket and other lawful fees to be exacted by court personnel; petitioners, acting through their agent, should exercise diligence in seeing to it that the full amount of docket fee is paid within the reglementary period of appeal, failure of which is fatal to their appeal in light of the proscription that the docket and other lawful fees should be paid in full; this Court in Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals[11] held that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rule; the CA in outrightly dismissing the appeal of petitioners acted within the bounds of law and exercised sound discretion; in any case, the present petition involves a pure question of fact, i.e., whether the duty of paying the correct and full amount of docket and other legal fees devolves upon petitioners, which this Court cannot take cognizance of.[12] | |||||
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2005-08-08 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| However, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended, prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a special civil action for certiorari. The 60-day period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[31] Such right to a speedy disposition of the case pertains not only to a private complainant in a criminal case,[32] but to an accused as well.[33] While the periods set by law are technical rules of procedure, these are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.[34] Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.[35] | |||||
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2005-07-08 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| However, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended, prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a special civil action for certiorari. The 60-day period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[31] Such right to a speedy disposition of the case pertains not only to a private complainant in a criminal case,[32] but to an accused as well.[33] While the periods set by law are technical rules of procedure, these are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.[34] Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.[35] | |||||
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2005-02-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not proportionate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[17] Unfortunately, respondent failed to justify its late payment of docket fees. | |||||
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2004-11-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The aforecited rule is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional.[32] It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege.[33] | |||||
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2001-03-08 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| This is not to state that procedural requirements are to be taken lightly. The Court has had several occasions to hold that "rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, `have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. xxx The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice xxx . Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions."[11] Thus, we have held that the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed reglamentary period is not a mere technicality, but jurisdictional.[12] | |||||
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2000-11-22 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| To be sure, the remedy of appeal is a purely statutory right and one who seeks to avail thereof must comply with the statute or rule.[9] For this reason, payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional.[10] However, as we have ruled in Aranas v. Endona,[11] the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on payment of appellate docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice. As early as 1946, in the case of Segovia v. Barrios,[12] we ruled that where an appellant in good faith paid less than the correct amount for the docket fee because that was the amount he was required to pay by the clerk of court, and he promptly paid the balance, it is error to dismiss his appeal because | |||||