This case has been cited 12 times or more.
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2004-04-14 |
VITUG, J. |
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| And thus, too, is the ruling of the Court in People vs. Tipay[19] - | |||||
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2002-02-15 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In a rape case, courts are guided by three principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused though innocent to disprove the charge; (b) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, where only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with the greatest caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[17] | |||||
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2001-11-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We are not unmindful that in People vs. Tipay,[43] citing People vs. Javier, G.R. No. 126096, 311 SCRA 122 (1999), we said that, "The minority of the victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court may take judicial notice thereof." Neither have we overlooked that in People vs. Dela Cruz,[44] we accepted the testimony of the mother as proof of the minority of the victims who were 15 and 14 years old, without requiring their birth certificates in compliance with the first circumstance of R.A. 7659. Note, however, that these aforementioned cases referred to proof of minority and not of actual age. Carefully considered, said cases are not on all fours with the present case. We must stress that here what is required to qualify the penalty to death is definite, independent, and indubitable proof that Mariedel was below seven years old at the time of her rape, conformably with the fourth circumstance of Section 11, R.A. 7659.[45] | |||||
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2001-11-14 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| The Court, however, does not agree with the penalty imposed by the court a quo upon the appellant. In People v. Brigildo,[13] People v. Tipay,[14] People v. Cula,[15] People v. Licanda,[16] People v. Tabanggay,[17] and People v. Canonigo,[18] the Court had the occasion to discuss the need to prove beyond reasonable doubt the age of the victim in prosecutions for incestuous rape. | |||||
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2001-05-24 |
PER CURIAM |
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| And then in People vs. Tipay[38] we further declared that | |||||
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2001-05-24 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The trial court, however, erred in not awarding civil indemnity ex delicto, which award is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape and is independent of the award of moral damages. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, a civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 should be imposed for rapes qualified by any of the circumstances for which the death penalty is authorized under R.A. No. 7659.[25] That rule shall also apply to Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, under which REYNALDO was charged, because said Articles are a reproduction of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No.7659. | |||||
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2001-03-16 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| In People v. Tipay,[42] the victim was alleged to be 15 years old. The Court did not impose the death penalty since the record of the case was bereft of any independent evidence which would accurately show the victim's age. Neither a simple allegation in the information and/or complaint that the victim is under 16 years nor lack of denial on the part of accused is sufficient to excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden to prove clearly the age of the rape victim as of the date the rape was committed. | |||||
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2001-02-28 |
PER CURIAM |
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| At all events, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The record of the case is bereft of any independent evidence, such as the victim's duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant's age. The fact that accused-appellant Manuel has not denied the allegation in the complaint that Maricel was 16 years old when the crime was committed cannot make up for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden in this regard. Because of this lapse, as well as the corresponding failure of the trial court to make a categorical finding as to the minority of the victim, we hold that the qualifying circumstance of minority under Republic Act No.7659 cannot be appreciated in this case, and accordingly the death penalty cannot be imposed. In People v. Tipay[60] we further declared - | |||||
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2001-02-26 |
PUNO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, the information alleged the special qualifying circumstance of relationship and minority. The prosecution evidence, however, is insufficient to prove the minority of the victim. Besides the bare declaration of the victim as to her age, there was no independent evidence presented by the prosecution that could accurately show her age.[13] For instance, her mother could have testified as to when the victim was born[14] but unfortunately, she was not presented in court. We have held that the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Failure to sufficiently establish the victim's age will bar any finding of rape in its qualified form.[15] Consequently, the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. | |||||
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2001-01-19 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| "But it was midnight when the rape happened after having their drinking spree. Accused went to sleep on top of the table and he saw the complainant sleeping on the other side of the table. There is no other person in the kitchen except the accused and complainant, hence, the accused's criminal intent was consummated." Time and again, we have held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" -- all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity.[12] The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.[13] Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnessess while testifying and detect if they are lying.[14] | |||||
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2000-11-22 |
VITUG, J. |
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| People vs. Tipay[18] held that the presentation of a birth certificate was not indispensable to prove minority; thus, the minority of a victim who was well below the age of ten, being quite manifest, could enable the court to take judicial notice thereof. Tipay thought to only be crucial years the age range of fifteen to seventeen years where minority might not always be "indubitable." | |||||
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2000-08-23 |
PER CURIAM |
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| the presentation of the minor's birth certificate but rightly, we did not rule out the presentation of the testimony of the victim's mother to prove minority in future cases. As minority was not proved by the prosecution, we did not mete out the death penalty. In People vs. Tipay,[25] the victim was alleged to be 15 years old. Once more, the Court observed that it was difficult to differentiate a 16 from an 18 year-old girl. We stressed that the crucial years were between 15 to 17 years and we held that, in | |||||