This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2013-08-12 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."[41] | |||||
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2007-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As to the issue of prescription, petitioner's possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into sole and exclusive ownership thereof. First, prescription applies to adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive possession. In order that a co- owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners, the following elements[33] must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. Clearly, petitioner cannot claim adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner. Mere silent possession by a co- owner; his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.[34] In this case, we find that petitioner effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co- ownership. Petitioner's only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to honor the extrajudicial settlement in 1994. Alternatively, possession by a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them.[35] A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other.[36] Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. [37] Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. [38] An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property.[39] | |||||
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2006-03-24 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership.[24] In Santos v. Santos,[25] citing the earlier case of Adille v. Court of Appeals,[26] this Court found occasion to rule that:Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. | |||||
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2003-06-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land by respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent. Hence, the free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are void.[30] | |||||
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2003-04-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks.[23] The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family; in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even with a registered or titled property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest, holding in trust the money of the depositors, which the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith. For this reason, the bank is not allowed to rely merely on the protective mantle of the land registration law, which is normally accorded only to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith.[24] | |||||
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2002-12-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property.[42] At the time of the grant to de Guzman of her Free Patent No. 575674 on May 9, 1975, the 38,641 square meter portion that overlapped Cornelio Lucas's lot was already private land. Hence, Free Patent No. 575674 issued to petitioner Iluminada de Guzman and OCT No. P-3876 issued pursuant thereto are void as to the 38,641 square meters that overlapped a portion of land covered by Free Patent No. 312027 issued to Cornelio Lucas and the OCT No. P-1073 issued | |||||