This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2012-06-13 |
BRION, J. |
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| Based on jurisprudence, there are two exceptions when a private party complainant or offended party in a criminal case may file a petition with this Court, without the intervention of the OSG: (1) when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution, and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party;[39] and (2) when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of the lower court.[40] | |||||
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2010-02-08 |
ABAD, J. |
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| But, when the trial court acquits the accused[19] or dismisses the case[20] on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability.[21] | |||||
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2009-12-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| This doctrine is laid down in our ruling in Heirs of Federico C. Delgado and Annalisa Pesico v. Luisito Q. Gonzalez and Antonio T. Buenaflor,[23] Cariño v. de Castro,[24] Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,[25] Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[26] Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,[27] and People v. Santiago,[28] where we held that only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the CA. | |||||
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2008-04-30 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| We are cognizant of our ruling in the cases of Perez v. Hagonoy,[15] Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,[16] People v. Santiago,[17] and Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[18] where we held that only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or state in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. At the same time, we acknowledged in those cases that a private offended party, in the interest of substantial justice, and where there appears to be a grave error committed by the judge, or where there is lack of due process, may allow and give due course to the petition filed. However, the special circumstances prevailing in the abovementioned cases are not present in the instant case. In those cases, the petitioners availed of petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In the instant case, the petition was filed under Rule 45. Moreover, both the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court found that petitioner was not duly authorized by the owner of the subject property to collect and receive rentals thereon. Thus, not only were the checks without valuable consideration; they were also issued for a non-existing account. With these undisputed findings, we cannot reconcile petitioner's allegation that she is the aggrieved party. Finally, petitioner cannot validly claim that she was denied due process considering that she availed of every opportunity to present her case. Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower courts in dismissing the complaints. | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| Finally, we will not delve into the merits of the Ombudsman's reversal of its initial finding of probable cause or cause to bring respondents to trial. Firstly, petitioner has not shown that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering such reversal. Secondly, it is clear from the records that the initial finding embodied in the May 10, 1996 Resolution was arrived at before the filing of respondent Ilao, Jr.'s Counter-Affidavit. Thirdly, it is the responsibility of the public prosecutor, in this case the Ombudsman, to uphold the law, to prosecute the guilty, and to protect the innocent. Lastly, the function of determining the existence of probable cause is proper for the Ombudsman in this case and we will not tread on the realm of this executive function to examine and assess evidence supplied by the parties, which is supposed to be exercised at the start of criminal proceedings. In Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,[46] as cited in Longos Rural Waterworks and Sanitation Association, Inc. v. Hon. Desierto,[47] we had occasion to rule that we cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to determine the existence of probable cause.[48] | |||||
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2000-08-31 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.[3] The above ruling has been reiterated in De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals[4] and Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,[5] in which the legal personality of private complainant to file a special civil action of | |||||
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2000-08-22 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| Justice.[34] Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine prima facie case.[35] Petitioner insists that in view of the passage of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the review authority of the Secretary of Justice after an information has been already filed in court may possibly transgress the right of a party to a speedy disposition of his case, in light of | |||||