This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2010-10-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In addition, although the accused used a gun to facilitate the rape, the RTC was correct in ruling that the accused is only guilty of simple rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. Where it is not specifically alleged in the Information that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of rape, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape underĀ Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.[38] As can be gleaned from the Information, such was not alleged and, thus, cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance of the rape. | |||||
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2004-06-03 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Appellant assails the inconsistencies in Christine's statements on whether appellant totally undressed her or inserted his penis through a hole in her shorts. These inconsistencies cannot exculpate appellant. Whether appellant raped Christine after undressing her or inserted his penis through a hole in her shorts is immaterial. Rape could take place under either situation. Besides, it is natural for inconsistencies to creep into the testimony of a rape victim who is of tender age like Christine. Courts expect minor inconsistencies when a child-victim narrates the details of a harrowing experience like rape.[42] Inconsistencies in a rape victim's testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.[43] A rape victim is not expected to mechanically keep in memory details of the rape incident and then when called to testify automatically give an accurate account of the traumatic experience she suffered.[44] | |||||
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2001-01-19 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| "But it was midnight when the rape happened after having their drinking spree. Accused went to sleep on top of the table and he saw the complainant sleeping on the other side of the table. There is no other person in the kitchen except the accused and complainant, hence, the accused's criminal intent was consummated." Time and again, we have held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" -- all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity.[12] The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.[13] Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnessess while testifying and detect if they are lying.[14] | |||||
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2000-10-06 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Accused-appellants next claim that the trial court erred in finding their guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt. This Court finds otherwise. The issue on this score really boils down to credibility. Ordinarily, this Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the witness as it has a better vantage point in observing his candor and behavior on the witness stand.[11] Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination.[12] Its assessment is respected unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[13] | |||||
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2000-07-14 |
PUNO, J. |
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| In any event, this circumstance, even if proved, will not affect the imposable penalty in this case. As earlier adverted to, appellant can only be held liable for simple rape which is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Corollarily, Article 63 of the Code provides that where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.[24] | |||||
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2000-06-08 |
PARDO, J. |
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| The contention is untenable. The alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential considering that they refer to trivial matters which have nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of rape, that is carnal knowledge through force or intimidation.[18] Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair her credibility.[19] If at all, they serve as proof that the witness is not coached or rehearsed. Furthermore, whatever doubts the alleged inconsistent statements might have created have been adequately explained by the prosecution. | |||||