This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2012-07-03 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[24] Thus, the ordinance should be applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.[25] In the instant case, there is no reason to depat1 from this rule, since the subject ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust. | |||||
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2011-03-16 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| DAR and Buklod aver that Resolution No. 29-A was not reviewed and approved by the NPC, in violation of the line in Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, stating that "[c]ities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning." Consideration must be given, however, to the use of the word "may" in the said sentence. Where the provision reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory but discretionary. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility.[34] The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[35] Since consultation with the NPC was merely discretionary, then there were only two mandatory requirements for a valid zoning or subdivision ordinance or regulation under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, namely, that (1) the ordinance or regulation be adopted by the city or municipal board or council; and (2) it be approved by the city or municipal mayor, both of which were complied with byl Resolution No. 29-A. | |||||
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2010-10-19 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The President's approving authority is of statutory origin. To us, there is nothing illegal, let alone unconstitutional, with the delegation to the President of the authority to approve the assignment by PNCC of its rights and interest in its franchise, the assignment and delegation being circumscribed by restrictions in the delegating law itself. As the Court stressed in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.,[81] the rights and privileges conferred under a franchise may be assigned if authorized by a statute, subject to such restrictions as may be provided by law, such as the prior approval of the grantor or a government agency.[82] | |||||
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2005-04-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The CA affirmed the NLRC's finding that the cases were filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period for filing money claims, which commenced on January 15, 1996, the date when the petitioners were terminated. It ruled that the NLRC was correct in holding that the termination of employment due to the implementation of the CARL did not amount to illegal dismissal, or termination due to an authorized cause under Art. 283[15] of the Labor Code, which would warrant the payment of separation pay. Citing the case of National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC,[16] the CA pronounced that the closure of business operations contemplated under Art. 283 refers to a voluntary act or decision on the part of the employer, not one forced upon it, as in this case, by an act of law or state to benefit petitioners by making them agrarian lot beneficiaries. [17] | |||||