This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-03-09 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Time and again, we have held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. [25] The reason for the liberal application of the rules before quasi-judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate injustice and hamper the just resolution of the case. Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of procedure. [26] | |||||
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2014-12-03 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.[28] | |||||
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2012-03-07 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Thus, petitioners should have assailed the January 16, 2001 decision and the June 25, 2002 resolution of the DARAB before the appellate court via a petition for review under Rule 43. By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review, petitioners have clearly taken an inappropriate recourse. For this reason alone, we find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition before it. While the rule that a petition for certiorari is dismissible when availed of as a wrong remedy is not inflexible and admits of exceptions such as when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; or when the broader interest of justice so requires; or when the writs issued are null and void; or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority[31] none of these exceptions obtains in the present case. | |||||