This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2013-08-28 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| At any rate, the Court must point out that negotiated contracts are not per se illegal. A negotiated contract is one that is awarded on the basis of a direct agreement between the Government and the contractor, without going through the normal procurement process, like obtaining the prior approval from another authority, or a competitive bidding process. It is generally resorted to for convenience, or "when time is of the essence, or where there is a lack of qualified bidders or contractors, or where there is conclusive evidence that greater economy and efficiency would be achieved."[53] The Court has upheld the validity of a negotiated contract made pursuant to law, like a negotiated contract entered into by a City Mayor pursuant to the then existing Local Government Code,[54] or a negotiated contract that eventually redounded to the benefit of the general public, even if there was no specific covering appropriation pursuant to COA rules,[55] or a negotiated contract that was made due to an emergency in the health sector,[56] or a negotiated contract for long overdue repair and renovation needed to provide better health services.[57] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| (5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.[29] | |||||
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2006-02-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Similarly, in Baylon v. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau,[21] petitioner and her co-accused were absolved from administrative liability, considering, inter alia, a previous ruling of the Court that the evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman, which incidentally is the same evidence presented in the administrative case, shows that there exists no probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against them, thus This Court takes note of special circumstances relative to the case at bar. The Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 142738 categorically declared the lack of probable cause to indict petitioner for the same acts constitutive of the administrative charge against her, hence, it ordered the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner and her co-accused. In the same vein, the COA Decision No. 2001-11 found no irregularity in the purchases by the NKTI of the blood bags from FVA and thus it lifted its previous disallowance of the payments to said purchases. Such determinations in favor of petitioner by other fora, independent they may be from the administrative action against her, serve as added reasons to warrant the taking of a hard look at the Ombudsman's Memorandum Reviews. | |||||
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2005-06-28 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| To begin with, grave abuse of discretion is committed when an act is 1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence;[20] or 2) executed "whimsically or arbitrarily" in a manner "so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined."[21] What constitutes grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as that which is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction.[22] | |||||
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2004-09-20 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The law allegedly violated is R. A. No. 3019, Section 3(e). There are two ways of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, to wit: (a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. In order to be held guilty of this crime, the act of the accused that caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence.[16] The elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused, are as follows:(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; | |||||
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2003-10-17 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| (5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[43] The causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under the foregoing section.[44] | |||||
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2002-12-11 |
CARPIO-MORALES, J. |
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| the general rule that a client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. Yet, the patent merits of petitioner's cause for the nullification of her suspension from public office nag the Court towards the realization that to deny her the instant petition now based merely on the fiction that the counsel's negligence binds the client is to unjustly seal petitioner's fate without the benefit of a review of the correctness and justness of her imposed administrative liability. Hers, thus, is a case of an extremely different kind; the exception to the rule on the effects of the counsel's mistake or negligence, for the application of the rule would result in serious injustice[30] to petitioner. Especially in this case where she had nothing to do with her counsel's mistake and negligence, thus clearly falling within the ambit of the reasons provided for by Ginete for the relaxation of the rules. This Court takes note of special circumstances relative to the case at bar. The Decision of this Court in G. R. No. 142738 categorically declared the lack of probable cause to indict petitioner for the same acts constitutive of the administrative charge against her, hence, it | |||||
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2002-12-11 |
CARPIO-MORALES, J. |
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| overpricing.[8] The COA found that FVA sold "Terumo" blood bags to the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) and to blood banks Our Lady of Fatima and Mother Seaton at prices lower than those at which it sold to the NKTI, leading to a consequent total loss to the government in the amount of P1,964,304.70. The Auditor of the NKTI accordingly ordered the suspension of purchases of blood bags from FVA and eventually disallowed the payment of blood bags amounting to P6,006,133.54. | |||||