This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-07-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC cannot simply presume that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of Chua's receipt thereof. There is simply no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence. In addition, from the inception of this case Chua has consistently denied having received subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the purported demand letter was still blank when presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for another purpose. Given Chua's denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the November 30, 1993 demand letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to present it without, however, adducing any evidence as to the date of Chua's actual receipt thereof. It must be stressed that [t]he prosecution must also prove actual receipt of [the notice of dishonor] because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused.[37] "The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice"[38] which the Court finds wanting in this case. | |||||
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2013-11-11 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.[16] If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.[17] This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.[18] The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.[19] | |||||
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2013-03-06 |
ABAD, J. |
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| It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that receipts for registered letters including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of dishonor.[9] To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused.[10] | |||||
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2012-07-04 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where x x x the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required"[27] in civil cases. On this basis, Emilia insists that the MTCC dismissed the BP 22 cases against her not on the ground of reasonable doubt but on insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the civil liability should likewise be extinguished. Emilia's Demurrer to Evidence, however, betrays this claim. Asserting insufficiency of evidence as a ground for granting said demurrer, Emilia herself argued therein that the prosecution has not proven [her] guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[28] And in consonance with such assertion, the MTCC in its judgment expressly stated that her guilt was indeed not established beyond reasonable doubt, hence the acquittal.[29] | |||||