This case has been cited 8 times or more.
|
2015-08-24 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| Even if timely raised, such argument of petitioners, as well as with respect to extraordinary acquisitive prescription, fails. "Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code."[42] There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired - ordinary acquisitive prescription which requires possession in good faith and just title for 10 years and, extraordinary prescription wherein ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.[43] However, it was clarified in the Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,[44] that only lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[45] And if the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must first be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period. Otherwise, Article 1113 of the Civil Code, which provides that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of prescription, applies.[46] | |||||
|
2014-12-03 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.[42] Together with the Torrens title, the tax declarations dated 1995 onwards presented by petitioner strengthens his claim of possession over the land before his dispossession on October 31, 2006 by respondent. | |||||
|
2014-12-03 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| The CA was in error in citing the case of De Grano v. Lacaba[43] to support its ruling. In that case, the respondent tried to prove prior possession, by presenting only his tax declarations, tax receipt and a certification tl·om the municipal assessor attesting that he had paid real property tax from previous years. The Court did not give credence to his claim because tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof of possession. The situation in the present case differs because aside from presenting his tax declarations, the petitioner submitted OCT No. RP-174(13789) which is the best evidence of ownership from where his right to possession arises. | |||||
|
2014-02-05 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| In Republic v. Rizalvo,[24] the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in Malabanan, viz:On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. x x x.[25] (Citation omitted and emphasis ours) | |||||
|
2012-07-18 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| The requirement of an "express declaration" contemplated by Malabanan is separate and distinct from the mere classification of public land as alienable and disposable.[55] On this point, Malabanan was reiterated by the recent case of Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr.[56] | |||||
|
2012-07-06 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| The Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the foregoing principles in Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr.[9] as follows: On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. x x x[10] | |||||
|
2012-04-16 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| Furthermore, the petitioners' application was filed after only (1) year from the time the subject property may be considered patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, was issued by the DAR only on July 13, 2000, which means that the counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can only start from such date. Before the property was declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by prescription. This is clear from the pronouncements of this Court in Heirs of Malabanan quoted above and in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo,[22] which states: On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.[23] | |||||
|
2012-02-20 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| Finally, that the respondent's application was filed after only four years from the time the subject property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the DAR's October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of possession whether for ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period. The principle enunciated in Heirs of Malabanan cited above was reiterated and applied in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo:[36] | |||||