Lawyerly

GR Nos. 164068-69

2013-11-19

ROLANDO P. DE LA CUESTA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

ABAD, J.

(j) The letter dated December 29, 1986 of the PCA Office of the Auditor to the PCA Administrator,[23] disallowing the P6 million "financial assistance" to COCOFED on the further ground of failure to secure the approval of the Chief Executive/President as provided for in Section 2 of P.D. 1997.[24]

GR Nos. 177857-58

2012-01-24

PHILIPPINE COCONUT v. REPUBLIC

VELASCO JR., J.

This brings to the fore the alleged violation of petitioners' right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case. In support of their contention, petitioners cite Licaros v. Sandiganbayan,[93] where the Court dismissed the case pending before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the accused's right to a speedy trial.

GR Nos. 174902-06

2008-02-15

ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

However, it is inaccurate to say that the writ will never issue to control the public official's discretion. Our jurisprudence is replete with exceptions to that rule. Thus, this Court held that if the questioned act was done with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority, the writ will be issued to control the exercise of such discretion.[13] Likewise, mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the Constitution.[14] Thus, a party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.[15]

GR Nos. 174902-06

2008-02-15

ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

These are only some of the cases showing respondent's disregard of the person's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. Sadly, the list of cases is growing. This is alarming. Here, respondent, the very protector of the people, became the perpetrator of the dictum that "justice delayed is justice denied." Indeed, the said dictum is not a meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with the dispensation of justice.[27] The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.[28] The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure, but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.[29] The people's respect and confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman are measured not only by its impartiality, fairness, and correctness of its acts, but also by its capacity to resolve cases speedily.

GR No.123346

2007-12-14

MANOTOK REALTY v. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

TINGA, J,

On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129.[7]

GR NO. 156052

2007-03-07

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. JOSE L. ATIENZA

CORONA, J.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest.[19] Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city's ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

GR NO. 174153

2006-10-25

RAUL L. LAMBINO v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as appearing in the signature sheets and has compared these with the signatures appearing in the book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x [99]

GR No. 149453

2003-04-01

PEOPLE v. PANFILO M. LACSON

CALLEJO, SR., J.

In the case at bar, even if the respondent's motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.[24] There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor,[25] he did so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)[26] executed their respective affidavits of desistance.[27] There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondent's motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondent's motion and to protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.

AM No. 00-8-05-SC

2003-01-31

RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE SANDIGANBAYAN.

PARDO, J.

PJ Garchitorena could not complain that he "did not know he was at peril of sanctions." A judge worthy of the office ought to know that he is in peril of administrative sanctions, including removal from office, the moment he incurs delay in deciding cases.[7] Mora decidendi reprobatur in lege. In Canson v. Garchitorena,[8] we admonished PJ Garchitorena that any act that would deprive a party of the right to a just and speedy trial shall be dealt with severely.[9] Furthermore, in the case of Licaros v. Sandiganbayan,[10] we said that Presiding Justice Garchitorena was in danger of chastisement for delay in the decision in that case, forcing the Supreme Court to dismiss the charges against the accused for violation of his Constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case.

AM No. 00-8-05-SC

2002-01-31

RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE SANDIGANBAYAN.

PARDO, J.

PJ Garchitorena could not complain that he "did not know he was at peril of sanctions." A judge worthy of the office ought to know that he is in peril of administrative sanctions, including removal from office, the moment he incurs delay in deciding cases.[7] Mora decidendi reprobatur in lege. In Canson v. Garchitorena,[8] we admonished PJ Garchitorena that any act that would deprive a party of the right to a just and speedy trial shall be dealt with severely.[9] Furthermore, in the case of Licaros v. Sandiganbayan,[10] we said that Presiding Justice Garchitorena was in danger of chastisement for delay in the decision in that case, forcing the Supreme Court to dismiss the charges against the accused for violation of his Constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case.

A M No. 00-8-05-SC

2001-11-28

RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE SANDIGANBAYAN.

PARDO, J.

We find no need to conduct a formal investigation of the charges in view of the admission of Justice Francis E. Garchitorena in his compliance of October 20, 2000, that there are indeed hundreds of cases pending decision beyond the reglementary period of ninety (90) days from their submission. In one case, he not only admitted the delay in deciding the case but took sole responsibility for such inaction for more than ten (10) years that constrained this Court to grant mandamus to dismiss the case against an accused to give substance and meaning to his constitutional right to speedy trial.[18]

	GR Nos. 164068-69 2013-11-19	ROLANDO P. DE LA CUESTA v. SANDIGANBAYAN ABAD, J.
(j) The letter dated December 29, 1986 of the PCA Office of the Auditor to the PCA Administrator,[23] disallowing the P6 million "financial assistance" to COCOFED on the further ground of failure to secure the approval of the Chief Executive/President as provided for in Section 2 of P.D. 1997.[24]
	GR Nos. 177857-58 2012-01-24	PHILIPPINE COCONUT v. REPUBLIC VELASCO JR., J.
This brings to the fore the alleged violation of petitioners' right to a speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case. In support of their contention, petitioners cite Licaros v. Sandiganbayan,[93] where the Court dismissed the case pending before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the accused's right to a speedy trial.
	GR Nos. 174902-06 2008-02-15	ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
However, it is inaccurate to say that the writ will never issue to control the public official's discretion. Our jurisprudence is replete with exceptions to that rule. Thus, this Court held that if the questioned act was done with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority, the writ will be issued to control the exercise of such discretion.[13] Likewise, mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the Constitution.[14] Thus, a party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.[15]
	GR Nos. 174902-06 2008-02-15	ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
These are only some of the cases showing respondent's disregard of the person's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. Sadly, the list of cases is growing. This is alarming. Here, respondent, the very protector of the people, became the perpetrator of the dictum that "justice delayed is justice denied." Indeed, the said dictum is not a meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with the dispensation of justice.[27] The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.[28] The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure, but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.[29] The people's respect and confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman are measured not only by its impartiality, fairness, and correctness of its acts, but also by its capacity to resolve cases speedily.
	GR No.123346 2007-12-14	MANOTOK REALTY v. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION TINGA, J,
On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129.[7]
	GR NO. 156052 2007-03-07	SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. JOSE L. ATIENZA CORONA, J.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest.[19] Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city's ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
	GR NO. 174153 2006-10-25	RAUL L. LAMBINO v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as appearing in the signature sheets and has compared these with the signatures appearing in the book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x [99]
	GR No. 149453 2003-04-01	PEOPLE v. PANFILO M. LACSON CALLEJO, SR., J.
In the case at bar, even if the respondent's motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.[24] There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor,[25] he did so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)[26] executed their respective affidavits of desistance.[27] There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondent's motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondent's motion and to protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.
	AM No. 00-8-05-SC 2003-01-31	RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE SANDIGANBAYAN. PARDO, J.
PJ Garchitorena could not complain that he "did not know he was at peril of sanctions." A judge worthy of the office ought to know that he is in peril of administrative sanctions, including removal from office, the moment he incurs delay in deciding cases.[7] Mora decidendi reprobatur in lege. In Canson v. Garchitorena,[8] we admonished PJ Garchitorena that any act that would deprive a party of the right to a just and speedy trial shall be dealt with severely.[9] Furthermore, in the case of Licaros v. Sandiganbayan,[10] we said that Presiding Justice Garchitorena was in danger of chastisement for delay in the decision in that case, forcing the Supreme Court to dismiss the charges against the accused for violation of his Constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case.
	AM No. 00-8-05-SC 2002-01-31	RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE SANDIGANBAYAN. PARDO, J.
PJ Garchitorena could not complain that he "did not know he was at peril of sanctions." A judge worthy of the office ought to know that he is in peril of administrative sanctions, including removal from office, the moment he incurs delay in deciding cases.[7] Mora decidendi reprobatur in lege. In Canson v. Garchitorena,[8] we admonished PJ Garchitorena that any act that would deprive a party of the right to a just and speedy trial shall be dealt with severely.[9] Furthermore, in the case of Licaros v. Sandiganbayan,[10] we said that Presiding Justice Garchitorena was in danger of chastisement for delay in the decision in that case, forcing the Supreme Court to dismiss the charges against the accused for violation of his Constitutional right to speedy disposition of the case.
	A M No. 00-8-05-SC 2001-11-28	RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE SANDIGANBAYAN. PARDO, J.
We find no need to conduct a formal investigation of the charges in view of the admission of Justice Francis E. Garchitorena in his compliance of October 20, 2000, that there are indeed hundreds of cases pending decision beyond the reglementary period of ninety (90) days from their submission. In one case, he not only admitted the delay in deciding the case but took sole responsibility for such inaction for more than ten (10) years that constrained this Court to grant mandamus to dismiss the case against an accused to give substance and meaning to his constitutional right to speedy trial.[18]

ABELARDO B. LICAROS v. SANDIGANBAYAN