This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2007-09-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| It is basic that after consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right[3] and its issuance to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.[4] However, considering the circumstances obtaining in this case and following our ruling in Rivero de Ortega, earlier cited, we hold that such writ of possession should apply only to the share of Josefa as may be determined in Civil Case No. Q-98-34312 or in any other proceeding that may be instituted by petitioners for the purpose of settling the undivided estate of Domingo Nicolas. | |||||
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2005-04-08 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Technically, there would be no prejudicial question to speak of in this case, if we are to consider the general rule that a prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[34] However, considering the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question, being to avoid two conflicting decisions,[35] prudence dictates that we apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the case at bar. | |||||
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2005-01-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is a settled rule that after the consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession[30] becomes a matter of right. In the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court held:. . . The question raised in this case has already been settled in Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals [184 SCRA 199], in which it was held that the pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession, because the same is a ministerial act of the trial court after title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. The ruling was reiterated in Navarra v. Court of Appeals [204 SCRA 850], in which we held that as a rule any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. | |||||
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2004-08-31 |
TINGA, J, |
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| In not a few cases, this Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[8] Stated differently, there must be between the two cases (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) that the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[9] | |||||
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2004-08-20 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceeding.[82] Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. | |||||
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2004-08-20 |
TINGA, J. |
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| To repeat, the hearing on Hi-Tone's Motion for Leave to Intervene scheduled on 20 April 1995 was rendered moot and academic by the trial court's questioned order. Intervention being merely ancillary and supplemental to the principal action,[85] it would no longer be warranted when a judgment has been rendered by the court.[86] With the order for mandamus already issued and the judgment by default already rendered, any subsequent hearing on motion for intervention would only be a charade as its outcome was virtually preempted and foreclosed by the court's earlier determination. Clearly, Hi-Tone was deprived of its right to due process. | |||||
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2003-08-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| It has been consistently held that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function.[10] The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond.[11] The court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment. If only to stress the writ's ministerial character, we have, in previous cases, disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance, just as we have held that issuance of the same may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.[12] | |||||