This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2016-01-27 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Thus, though the Court is cognizant of the general rule, in cases of gross and palpable negligence of counsel and of extrinsic fraud, the Court must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.[38] For negligence to be excusable, it must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against,[39] and for the extrinsic fraud to justify a petition for relief from judgment, it must be that fraud which the prevailing party caused to prevent the losing party from being heard on his action or defense. Such fraud concerns not the judgment itself but the manner in which it was obtained.[40] Guided by these pronouncements, the Court in the case of Apex Mining, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals[41] wrote: If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyer's professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. | |||||
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2009-07-03 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their interest in the case. While lawyers are expected to exercise a reasonable degree of diligence and competence in handling cases for their clients, the realities of law practice as well as certain fortuitous events sometimes make it almost physically impossible for lawyers to be immediately updated on a particular client's case. [29] | |||||
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2008-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As instructed, I immediately proceeded to the office of Mr. Bitanga located at the 12th Floor, Planters Development Bank Building, 314 Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City. I delivered the said letter to Ms. Dette Ramos, a person of sufficient age and discretion, who introduced herself as one of the employees of Mr. Bitanga and/or of the latter's companies.[31] (Emphasis supplied.) We emphasize that when petitioner signed the Contract of Guaranty and assumed obligation as guarantor, his address in the said contract was the same address where the demand letter was served.[32] He does not deny that the said place of service, which is the office of Macrogen, was also the address that he used when he signed as guarantor in the Contract of Guaranty. Nor does he deny that this is his office address; instead, he merely insists that the person who received the letter and signed the receiving copy is not an employee of his company. Petitioner could have easily substantiated his allegation by a submission of an affidavit of the personnel manager of his office that no such person is indeed employed by petitioner in his office, but that evidence was not submitted.[33] All things are presumed to have been done correctly and with due formality until the contrary is proved. This juris tantum presumption stands even against the most well-reasoned allegation pointing to some possible irregularity or anomaly.[34] It is petitioner's burden to overcome the presumption by sufficient evidence, and so far we have not seen anything in the record to support petitioner's charges of anomaly beyond his bare allegation. Petitioner cannot now be heard to complain that there was an irregular service of the demand letter, as it does not escape our attention that petitioner himself indicated "314 Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City" as his office address in the Contract of Guaranty. | |||||
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2007-08-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two reglementary periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put at last an end to litigation.[11] | |||||
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2005-05-16 |
TINGA, J. |
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| As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[14] | |||||
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2004-11-19 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Although as a general rule, the party filing a petition for relief must strictly comply with the sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month reglementary periods under Section 3, Rule 38,[48] it is not without exceptions. The Court relaxed the rule in several cases[49] and held that the filing of a petition for relief beyond the sixty 60-day period is not fatal so long as it is filed within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment.[50] | |||||
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2004-09-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. Although it expects counsel to amply protect its interest, it cannot just sit back, relax and await the outcome of its case.[36] In keeping with the normal course of events, it should have taken the initiative "of making the proper inquiries from its counsel and the trial court as to the status of its case"[37] and of extending to him the "necessary assistance."[38] For its failure to do so, it has only itself to blame. Indeed, from lethargy is misfortune born. | |||||
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2003-12-11 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| To cater to the pleas of Woodward and to reinstate its Complaint would put a premium on negligence and thus encourage the non-termination of this case. Like all other clients, Respondent Woodward is bound by the acts of its counsel in the conduct of a case and has to bear with the consequences thereof. It cannot thereafter be heard to complain that the result might have been different had its counsel proceeded differently. The rationale for the rule is easily discernible. If the negligence of counsel be admitted as a reason for opening a case, there would never be an end to litigation so long as there is a new counsel to be hired every time it is shown that the prior one had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned.[15] | |||||
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2003-09-24 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the OSG's errors. Petitioner should have taken the initiative of making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the status of his case.[23] Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.[24] To agree with petitioner's stance would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on the part of his counsel.[25] The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts long-settled doctrines of trial and procedure.[26] | |||||