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BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY v. BENJAMIN M. BITANGA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR NO. 153413 2007-03-01	NECTARINA S. RANIEL v. PAUL JOCHICO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
It is well to stress the settled rule that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the SEC, will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. They carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA.[8] Such findings are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that it had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.[9] This rule is rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, as well as in the respect to be accorded the determinations made by administrative bodies in general on matters falling within their respective fields of specialization or expertise.[10]
	GR NO. 166197 2007-02-27	METROPOLITAN BANK v. ASB HOLDINGS SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
We do not agree. A cursory reading of the Rehabilitation Plan debunks this assertion. The Plan provides that dacion en pago transaction will be effected only if the secured creditors, like petitioner, agree thereto and under terms and conditions mutually agreeable to private respondents and the secured creditor concerned. The dacion en pago program is essential to eventually pay all creditors and rehabilitate private respondents. If the dacion en pago does not materialize in case secured creditors refuse to agree thereto, the Rehabilitation Plan contemplates to settle the obligations to secured creditors with mortgaged properties at selling prices. This is for the general interest of the employees, creditors, unit buyers, government, general public, and the economy.[21] (Underscoring supplied) With respect to the third assigned error, we note that the same was not raised by petitioner bank in its Comment/Opposition to the Rehabilitation Plan filed with the SEC Hearing Panel. Such belated issue cannot be considered, especially because it involves a question of fact, the resolution of which is normally beyond the authority of this Court as it is not a trier of facts.[22]
	GR No. 159696 2005-11-17	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. CA PANGANIBAN, J.
Having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC,[13] the CA clearly has the discretion to issue an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction to secure the rights of private respondent pending appeal of his dismissal. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the exercise of judgment by the courts in injunctive matters should not be interfered with.[14]
	GR No. 146717 2004-11-22	TRANSFIELD PHILIPPINES v. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION TINGA, J,
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive right or interest; it is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, the only limitation being that this discretion should be exercised based upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.[51]
	AM No. RTJ-03-1760 2004-01-15	FELICIDAD B. DADIZON v. JUDGE ENRIQUE C. ASIS QUISUMBING, J.
Issuance of said writ is entirely within the discretion of the trial court. The only limitation is that this discretion should be exercised based upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.[22] The requisites for injunctive relief are (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.[23] Respondent was able to show that petitioners in said case were entitled to the writ because there existed in favor of the petitioners a clear and unmistakable right therefor, and the facts clearly showed an urgent and paramount necessity for its issuance to prevent serious damage. There, the petitioners adequately proved their status as co-owners of the subject ancestral house and lot, and that they were forced out of the ancestral house preparatory to their intended sale.