This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2003-09-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to satisfy the required quantum of evidence that would produce the conviction of the appellants on the basis of conspiracy. The mere fact that Alvin Brul, the gunman, arrived and left the crime scene together with appellants does not automatically mean that they shared a common design and a unity of purpose in killing the deceased. There is no evidence that appellants performed an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy. Neither was it established that their act of fleeing towards Alvin was an act of giving moral assistance to the criminal act of the latter. As testified by prosecution witness, Rolando Suratos, he did not see what appellants did when they ran towards Alvin. Clearly, the finding of conspiracy in this case was based merely on conjecture, and thus cannot pass the test of moral certainty. Even if we consider the alleged previous disagreement between the deceased and the appellants as a motive for killing the former, still, conspiracy would not lie. This is so because mere presence, knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[24] | |||||
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2003-05-09 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, no overt act was established to prove that appellant shared with and concurred in the criminal design of Osabel, Dador and Purcino. Assuming that she had knowledge of the conspiracy or she acquiesced in or agreed to it, still, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime in furtherance of the conspiracy, mere knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not sufficient to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy.[18] Conspiracy transcends mere companionship.[19] | |||||