This case has been cited 16 times or more.
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2015-09-02 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The lame defense of denial is all that appellant could offer against the prosecution evidence. Denial is a negative and self-serving evidence that requires to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence of nonculpability to merit credibility.[57] Otherwise, it will not overcome the testimony of the prosecution witness/es who testified on affirmative matters.[58] Except for the testimonial assertion of appellant in the present case, no credible corroborating evidence was presented by the defense to bolster his denial. Emelina's positive assertions that she handed to appellant the money to be delivered to a money changer in Mabini, Manila, and that he did not return the service motorcycle, prevail over the denial of the appellant. Appellant's admission[59] that he was at E. Gloria Money Changer shop in the morning of July 11, 2007 further served to bolster the testimony of Emelina. | |||||
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2015-02-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.[34] Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.[35] The appellate court never provided any reason why AAA's testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant's testimony itself.[36] The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing experience.[37] | |||||
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2007-08-17 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Appellant's argument is not well-taken. It is the judge's prerogative to ask clarificatory queries to ferret out the truth.[53] It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveal certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party.[54] After all, the judge is the arbiter and ought to be satisfied himself as to the respective merits and claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands of due process.[55] Also, being the arbiter, he may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite proceedings and prevent unnecessary waste of time.[56] | |||||
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2005-02-17 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Incidents such as the non-filing of memoranda and non-compliance by the parties with order to file comment are not adequate justification for failing to render a decision within the prescribed period.[18] A judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed it is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived.[19] | |||||
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2003-09-12 |
PER CURIAM |
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| These discrepancies pointed out by appellant refer to trivial matters. They are inconsequential as they have nothing to do with the essential fact in the crime of rape which is carnal knowledge.[34] Discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies given in open court do not necessarily discredit a witness especially when they refer to minor matters that have no substantial effect on the nature of the offense.[35] | |||||
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2003-06-18 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| ...The testimonies of complainant concerning her age and that of her father, herein accused-appellant, concerning this matter are insufficient. In People vs. Tundag, [342 SCRA 704, (2000)] in which the complaints alleged that the victim was 13 years old at the time of the rapes, it was held that it was error for the trial court to take judicial notice of the victim's age even if the defense admitted the victim's minority. The Court emphasized that there must be independent proof, such as a birth certificate, of the age of the victim... Aside from complainant's declaration of her age during her testimony, the prosecution failed to adequately establish her age.[29] This is a vital element of the offense, one that spells the difference between life and death of the accused. Nor would judicial notice of her minority suffice. Under Section 3[30] of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that as to any matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact.[31] Although it appears from the record that a Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons attesting to the date of Jennifer's birth was executed by two neighbors, the affiants were not presented in court to attest to the facts contained in the affidavit. Lastly, the same affidavit was not offered in evidence by the prosecution at all. | |||||
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2003-05-08 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In People v. Rivera,[45] we held that the trial court could only take judicial notice of the victim's minority when the latter is, for example, 10 years old or below. Otherwise, the prosecution has the burden of proving the victim's age at the time of the rape. While it is true that in this case the defense admitted the medical certificate dated August 29, 1997, which indicated that private complainant was fifteen years old at the time of the examination,[46] we held in Rivera that the absence of denial on the part of appellant does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. Besides, the medical certificate is not the primary evidence of the date of birth of party examined. In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is inappropriate, despite the defense counsel's admission of the medical certificate. | |||||
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2002-11-27 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| We disagree. While the Constitution recognizes the right of the accused to competent and independent counsel of their own choice, their option to secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute.[26] The insistence of herein appellant on | |||||
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2002-10-14 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| if found to be credible.[21] A person accused of a crime may be convicted, not on the number of witnesses against him, but on the credibility of even one witness who is able to prove his guilt beyond a shadow of doubt.[22] In the present case, appellant contends that Joyce's testimony is not credible. While she testified that he raped her in September 1993, she later claimed that it took place in July 1993. | |||||
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2002-10-14 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| identifying him as the person who raped her, not just once but twice. Upon the other hand, appellant's defense merely consists of bare denial, an intrinsically weak defense, specially because it was not buttressed by strong exculpatory evidence.[36] In view of Joyce's convincing testimony that she was raped sometime in | |||||
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2002-09-11 |
PANGANIBAN |
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| In regard to the first rape, reclusion perpetua was properly imposed, because the crime happened on September 20, 1993, prior the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law (RA 7659). However, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,[31] the indemnity ex | |||||
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2002-07-03 |
PER CURIAM |
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| 'Sec. 40. - Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree - The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.' "The above provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is a controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person. (Citing People vs. Samillano, 207 SCRA 50, 54 (1992); People vs. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37, 45 (1991)) The word "pedigree" under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and places where these facts occurred and the names of relatives. (Id.) All three requisites are present in the case at bar." In this case, the age of May Ann, who was six years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and duly proven during the trial. The records[45] show that a certified true copy of the certification from the Register of Births was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bauang, La Union, stating that the date of birth of May Ann was October 21, 1989. This, however, was not duly marked as an exhibit. However, May Ann's age was nonetheless duly proven by her testimony and the testimony of both her parents. A year after the rape, May Ann testified that she was seven years old.[46] Her father Antonio testified that he and Mirasol had five children, namely Mark Anthony, Marvin, May Ann, Madel, and Daniel. When asked about May Ann's age, he said that May Ann was six (6) years old.[47] On cross-examination, Antonio was again asked how old May Ann was and he answered that she was six (6) years old.[48] A year after the rape, her mother Mirasol testified that May Ann was turning seven years old.[49] Parents have personal knowledge of the age of their children. Moreover, judicial notice of May Ann's age may be taken considering that she is below 10 years old.[50] | |||||
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2002-03-18 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| There was no more need for the prosecution to present Jewelyn's certificate of live birth or other equally acceptable official document to prove her age. In People vs. Doroteo Abaño,[19] such independent proof can be dispensed with in cases where the court can take judicial notice of the victim's tender age in view of the manifest minority of the victim. Judicial notice of the victim's age may be taken when the victim is ten (10) years old or below.[20] The trial court carefully noted in its Decision that Jewelyn then was only seven (7) years old. Ramona Franco, the victim's mother, categorically testified that her daughter was born on October 16, 1991. This Court has ruled that the testimony of the mother is admissible as she is in the best position to know when she delivered her child.[21] Even the appellant himself admitted, when he testified in May of 1999, that she was "about seven (7) years old."[22] | |||||
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2002-01-23 |
PER CURIAM |
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| A - She is six (6) years old."[37] There is no more need to present the live birth certificate of Judelyn or other equally acceptable official document concerning her date of birth to determine Judelyn's age. Such independent proof can be dispensed with in cases where the court can take judicial notice of the victim's tender age in view of the manifest minority of the victim.[38] Judicial notice of the victim's age may be taken when the victim is 10 years old or below.[39] With the concurrence of the special qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship with appellant, the rape committed by appellant is qualified as heinous. The imposition of the death penalty is thus warranted. | |||||
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2001-12-11 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Nor is there sufficient evidence of complainant's age. The testimonies of complainant concerning her age and that of her father, herein accused-appellant, concerning this matter are insufficient. In People v. Tundag,[39] in which the complaints alleged that the victim was 13 years old at the time of the rapes, it was held that it was error for the trial court to take judicial notice of the victim's age even if the defense admitted the victim's minority. The Court emphasized that there must be independent proof, such as a birth certificate, of the age of the victim. In People v. San Agustin,[40] this Court held that the latter's minority had not been sufficiently established notwithstanding the appellant's admission that the victim was 13 years of age. Judicial notice of the victim's age may be taken if the victim is 10 years old or below,[41] but not where, as in this case, the victim is alleged to be 14 years old when she was raped. | |||||
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2001-11-22 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| This Court notes that the trial court only awarded civil indemnity to the victim. In addition to civil indemnity, moral damages may likewise be awarded to rape victims.[13] Moral damages are awarded in rape cases without need of showing that the victim suffered from mental, physical, and psychological trauma as these are too obvious to require recital by the victim during the trial.[14] | |||||