This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2013-11-11 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| As for the penalty, We note with approval the observation made by the appellate court that the amount of the property taken was not established by an independent and reliable estimate. Thus, the Court may fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case or impose the minimum penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC.[44] In this case, We agree with the observation made by the appellate court in accordance with the rule that "if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00."[45] Accordingly, We impose the prescribed penalty under Art. 309(6) of the RPC, which is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. The circumstance of the breaking of the door, even if proven during trial, cannot be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance as it was not alleged in the Information.[46] Thus, the Court finds that the penalty prescribed should be imposed in its medium period, that is to say, from two (2) months and one (1) day to three (3) months of arresto mayor. | |||||
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2013-09-11 |
BRION, J. |
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| We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held that inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of senses or recall.[9] | |||||
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2009-09-10 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.[19] The alleged inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused- appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.[20] | |||||
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2003-08-19 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Dwelling, also alleged in the amended Information, is likewise aggravating. The triggerman showed greater perversity when, although outside the house, he attacked his victim inside the latter's own house when he could have very well committed the crime without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of the victim's home. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense - it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own abode, although the assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the outside.[14] | |||||
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2002-11-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| promulgated December 1, 2000, the information should state not only the designation of the offense and the acts and omissions constituting it but shall also specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. As the Rules now stand, dwelling cannot be considered as aggravating since it is not alleged in the information.[60] Being favorable to the appellant, Section 8 should be applied retroactively, though the offense was committed way back on September 3, 1994. Under Article 248[61] of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty under Art. 63[62] of the Revised Penal | |||||
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2002-02-13 |
PUNO, J. |
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| The accused-appellant assails the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the identity of Juan Bacuta's assailants. He admits being present at the scene of the crime but points to Remwel Cornel and Daryl Cornel as the culprits. In upholding the factual findings of the trial court, we adhere to the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons because of the trial court's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to observe their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under gruelling examination.[17] The prosecution witness Nestor Astorga clearly saw the accused-appellant stab Bacuta on the chest while he (Jocel Bejo) was on board the left back portion of Bacuta's owner-type jeep and Bacuta was on the driver's seat of the jeep. The other witnesses, Alolor and Bartolo, in unmistakable terms, also identified Jocel Bejo as the assailant who jumped off the left back portion of the jeep carrying a bloodstained knife. All three witnesses were innocent residents along Legaspi Street where the stabbing incident took place. They had no reason to falsely testify against the accused-appellant. Their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[18] We find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. In light of the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of the accused Jocel Bejo, the latter's denial of the charge against him and his attempt to point to Remwel Cornel and his brother Daryl Cornel as the assailants of Juan Bacuta must prove futile. The running case law is that positive identification of the accused will prevail over the defense of denial.[19] | |||||
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2002-02-13 |
PUNO, J. |
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| In the instant case, the concerted action of accused Jocel Bejo and his companion who might have been Remwel Cornel of simultaneously climbing up the jeep of the deceased and stabbing him in rapid succession, and then jumping from the jeep and fleeing from the scene of the crime and running together towards the same direction clearly showed a common design and community of purpose which positively and unmistakably established a conspiracy between them to kill Juan Bacuta." (emphasis supplied)[23] We disagree, however, with the trial court's finding that the attack upon Bacuta was treacherous. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms of execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make.[24] It must be clearly shown that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen to accomplish the crime without risk to the aggressor.[25] We have ruled that treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused where the crime was the result of a casual encounter and the accused had no time to reflect on the method of execution of the crime.[26] In the instant case, the meeting between the accused-appellant's group and the victim was obviously a casual encounter. The impulsive stabbing followed a brief heated argument between the group and Bacuta regarding the latter's driving. While the attack may have been sudden, the circumstances show that the casual, brief, and tension-filled encounter did not afford the accused-appellant an opportunity to plan and deliberately adopt the method of assault as to accomplish the crime without risk to himself. He simply used whatever weapon he had on hand. To our mind, therefore, treachery cannot be appreciated. | |||||
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2002-01-25 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Finally, accused-appellant should be ordered to pay damages for the victim's loss of earning capacity. According to the wife of the victim, the latter, who died at the age of 57,[34] was earning P35,000.00 a year from his tobacco business and an average of P4,500.00 a month as a tricycle driver.[35] The gross annual income therefore of the victim was P89,000.00. Using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality,[36] the loss of his earning capacity should be computed as follows: Net Earning Capacity (X) = Life Expectancy x Gross | |||||
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2001-11-26 |
PARDO, J. |
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| We agree with the Solicitor General that it was proper to award compensation to the heirs of the victim for loss of earning capacity, pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil Code. Although the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support this claim, testimonial evidence is sufficient to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity.[54] The unrebutted testimony of Angelita Kasilag is sufficient basis for the award. At the time of his death, Ernesto, thirty-three years old, was earning an average of P150.00 a day buying and selling bottles and junk materials.[55] If not for his untimely death, he would have earned more for his family. The additional compensation for loss of earning capacity would be computed based on the following formula:[56] | |||||