This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2002-02-13 |
PUNO, J. |
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| That there was conspiracy between the accused-appellant and Remwel Cornel is also clearly borne out by the records. Thus, it is not decisive whether the accused-appellant or Remwel Cornel delivered the fatal blow which penetrated Bacuta's lung. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.[20] There is conspiracy among perpetrators of a crime when there is a unity in purpose and intention in the commission of a crime.[21] It does not require a previous plan or agreement to commit assault as it is sufficient that at the time of such aggression, all the accused manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack.[22] Without a shadow of doubt, Juan Bacuta's assailants, including the accused Jocel Bejo, did not previously conceive of a plan to attack Bacuta. The assailants' encounter with Bacuta along Legaspi Street was purely coincidental. This notwithstanding, at the time of the attack, the accused Jocel Bejo and Remwel Cornel manifested their common purpose to kill Bacuta by getting on Bacuta's jeep almost at the same time and stabbing him simultaneously on the chest and getting off the jeep almost at the same time. The unity of the two assailants continued even after the stabbing. When Remwel Cornel ran away from the crime scene, Jocel Bejo called him back and after briefly conversing, they ran together towards the Divine Jesus Memorial Park. The trial court correctly pointed out, viz:"However, it has not escaped notice by the court that there was no evidence showing that the violent and deadly attack on the deceased by Jocel Bejo and his companion was the product of a prior or pre-existing conspiracy between them to kill the victim. What happened was obviously the tragic result of a casual encounter between the deceased and his assailants. But, of course, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence, and proof of previous agreement to commit the crime is not also essential to establish conspiracy - it may be inferred from acts of the accused, whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime can show its existence (People v. Languire, 252 SCRA 213). For conspiracy to exist it is not essential that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. It may be shown by the simultaneous and contemporaneous acts of the accused (People v. Habilla, 252 SCRA 471). | |||||