This case has been cited 7 times or more.
|
2011-09-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.[27] | |||||
|
2010-04-07 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.[27] In the present case, intent to kill the victim could not be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latter's body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt.[28] When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate[29] issued by the doctor who attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor." | |||||
|
2008-02-06 |
TINGA, J, |
||||
| Although it can be fairly assumed that the injuries suffered by Rogelio were sustained during the fistfight, it is not conclusive that the same were inflicted purposely to kill him. For one, if Jun in fact had been carrying a bolo with intent of killing Rogelio, and if indeed Banjo had conspired with Jun, it is no small wonder why the wounds inflicted were more superficial than mortal, more mild than grave. That Rogelio was able to go home shortly after the tricycle incident without being pursued by his aggressor also shows that Jun and Banjo were not intent on beating him to death or even leaving him for dead.[31] It is thus wrong to infer that the intent to kill was present in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt.[32] Moreover, Rogelio's suggested motive for killing him, i.e., his previous altercation with Jun, was too weak and shallow a reason to kill under the circumstances.[33] | |||||
|
2008-02-06 |
TINGA, J, |
||||
| Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to sustain the claim that petitioners had any intention to kill Rogelio. When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical injuries only and in this case, less serious physical injuries considering the attending physician's opinion that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks to heal.[37] | |||||
|
2004-01-15 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Intent to kill is the principal element of attempted or frustrated homicide, or murder.[47] Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.[48] The testimonies of the doctors who treated Gloria did not establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth and severity of the wounds sustained by her. Such medical evidence could have shed light as to the relative position of Aradillos and Gloria at the time the blows were inflicted, whether the wounds sustained by the victim were a result of an intentional infliction or accidental, or whether it was mortal or superficial. In People vs. Matyaong,[49] the Court discussed the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained by a victim, viz.:In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to the function of the various organs, and also the danger to life. A division into mortal and nonmortal wounds, if it could be made, would be very desirable; but the unexpected complications and the various extraneous causes which give gravity to the simplest cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination of some injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification impracticable. The general classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and mortal wounds may be used, but the possibility of the slight wound terminating with the loss of the person's life, and the apparently mortal ending with only a slight impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. . . . | |||||
|
2004-01-15 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| In conclusion, absent competent proof, and there being no conspiracy, Aradillos should be held liable only for less serious physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,[61] as the wounds sustained by Gloria required medical attendance of fourteen days.[62] | |||||
|
2002-09-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| of the victim is not properly established.[14] In this case, appellant's claim of the existence of unlawful aggression on the victim's part is purely speculative. It is unsubstantiated by credible evidence. There being no unlawful aggression by the deceased, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, which appellant could claim. The trial court found that the victim, Pableo Fernandez, was trying to pacify appellant, not attack him.[15] As testified in court by witnesses Rodulfo Perolino and Dodo Aviles, Fernandez was merely trying to pacify appellant, Nel Mahilum. The | |||||