This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2016-01-13 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.[41] | |||||
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2014-10-22 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner of the commission of the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, is hearsay and cannot be considered by this Court. A witness can testify only on the facts that she knows of his own personal knowledge, or more precisely, those which are derived from her own perception.[24] A witness may not testify on what she merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what she has learned, read or heard.[25] | |||||
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2013-11-20 |
BRION, J. |
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| It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception.[26] A witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard.[27] Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits.[28] | |||||
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2012-02-01 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness' own perception.[18] Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters.[19] Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.[20] | |||||
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2010-07-28 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| In finding that the assignments of the TCCs in favor of Petron were fraudulent, we find that the CTA En Banc reversibly erred in relying on the abovementioned affidavits executed by the grantees' former general managers/officers who, after disavowing knowledge of the assignment of the subject TCCs and Petron's delivery of bunker fuel oil in consideration thereof, requested the cancellation of the TCCs.[55] Without said erstwhile general managers/officers being presented on the witness stand to affirm the truth and veracity of their statements, the affidavits they executed are, however, correctly impugned by Petitioner as hearsay for lack of opportunity to cross-examine said affiants. Almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, or for want of suggestion and inquiries,[56] the infirmity of affidavits as species of evidence is a matter of judicial experience and are thus considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.[57] Unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon, the rule is settled that affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule.[58] | |||||
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2006-11-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[15] this Court held:...As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. | |||||
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2006-09-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.[17] | |||||
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2005-12-14 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.[39] This is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.[40] The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.[41] | |||||
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2005-10-25 |
TINGA, J. |
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| It has been said that where, regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, and the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.[13] On this basis, the statements attributed to Ibarra regarding the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of sale related to the court by respondent are admissible if only to establish the fact that such statements were made and the tenor thereof. | |||||